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Pr~face
NINETEENTH-CENTURY Kentucky in many ways resem-
bled medieval Germany, which was essentially a loose
collection ofminiature states, duchies, principalities, and
other constitutional subdivisions and only in the loosest
sense a political unit. Although Kentucky certainly pos-
sessed stronger bonds of central control, her essential
governmental functions were in many ways conducted
not from Frankfort but from the seats ofher multitudinous
counties (numbering 119 by 1886). Often the county
rather than the state or national government controlled
the destinies of Kentuckians, regulating their affairs from
apprenticeship to probate. County officials likewise
mimicked medieval bureaucrats, often assuming a pro-
prietary attachment to their offices.
By 1900, Kentucky led the country in the production of
race horses and whiskey and placed near the top in
tobacco, coal, and counties. Counties served well the
passions of Kentuckians for individualisn1, local control,
economic gain, and, above all, political power. The full
story of Kentucky cannot be understood without an ap-
preciation of the place of the county in her past.
Many people contributed to this book. In particular, I
wish to thank Dr. Steve Channing, Dr. Thomas D. Clark,
Mr. Paul Willis, Mr. Sandy Gilchrist, and Dr. Jacqueline
Bull. Above all I want to thank my three children, Suzy,
Julie, and Betsy, for keeping biting and fighting to a
minimum during the period of my writing. To them I
affectionately dedicate this book.
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1THE STAKES
OF POWER
KENTUCKIANS HAVE ALWAYS taken great pride in their
counties. This was especially true before 1900 when most
Kentuckians lived on farms or in rural towns and villages
and owed their greatest allegiance to local institutions
such as family, church, political party, and state and local
government. For most, Washington, D.C., remained a
distant capital and the nation a remote loyalty even after
the Civil War. In an age of relative immobility, "home"
had a more permanent and meaningful hold on the hearts
and minds of Kentuckians. And for most Kentuckians,
"home" meant one's county rather than his town or vil-
lage.
Kentucky's preoccupation with counties was natural to
the child of a parent so concerned with the invention and
perfection of these local institutions. More than most
colonies, Virginia had depended upon counties for her
government, delegating to these entities the principal
responsibility for tax assessment and collection, law en-
forcement, military training, and many of the other fun-
damental devices of social control. After a period of
turmoil approaching rebellion, the leaders of Virginia's
counties had become the leaders of the colony. To be a
county squire in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
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Virginia was to be at the top of the social and political
ladder.
Kentucky, once the westernmost county of Virginia,
assumed the traditions of local government from that
colony. Early in her statehood, Kentucky displayed a
particular predilection for the art ofcounty-making which
did not abate as the decades passed. By the end of the
nineteenth century, Kentuckians had created 119
counties, adding still another in the early twentieth cen-
tury. Originally intended to be but subdivisions of the
state and, as such, her agents in local affairs, most of
Kentucky's counties had become semiautonomous by the
mid-nineteenth century, deriving a fierce loyalty from
their residents. Rivalries between counties could be as
intense as those between states.
At first most of Kentucky's counties were created be-
cause settlers found it difficult to reach county seats not
within one day's travel from home. But by the third
decade of the nineteenth century, entrepreneurs and
politicians had begun to influence the formation of new
counties. The response of citizens of the southern part of
Mercer County in and around Danville was typical. They
became so chagrined with the policies of the Harrods-
burg-dominated county government that in 1834 they
began to petition for a new county. Danvillians accused
the Mercer County Court of overtaxation, fraudulent
elections, and discriminatory fiscal planning. Disagree-
ment over national politics compounded their frustration,
the Danville crowd favoring the Whigs while their coun-
terparts in Harrodsburg generally supported the Demo-
crats. After eight years of petition and counterpetition, in
which the dissidents advocated constitutional secession,
the legislature finally authorized the divorce of the south
from the north with the formation of Boyle County.
Land speculators often lurked behind proposals to form
new counties. An enterprising farmer in Trigg County
petitioned the legislature shortly after the Civil War to
form a new county out ofhis farm and part ofneighboring
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Marshall County. While the petitioner's stated purpose
was to honor his daughter Henrietta (by naming the
county after her), detractors accused him of trying to
convert his infertile farm into a county seat and sell off
town lots at inflated prices. The opposition prevailed,
first defeating the proposal at a special election and then
throttling the measure in the General Assembly.
Rivaling the intensity of battles over the creation of
new counties were contests over the location of county
seats. Once a county seat was established it usually was
not moved, but neighboring towns often attempted to
secure the political and economic benefits accruing to
such governmental centers by obtaining legislative per-
mission to hold special referenda on the question of
relocation. Maysville successfully engineered such a
campaign in 1848, despite the efforts of Washington,
Mason County's first county seat, to prevent a move. More
typical was the indecisiveness of the commissioners who
established Lee County in 1870. Unable to agree on the
location of a county seat, they left it up to the voters at a
special election. When Beattyville was chosen over
Proctor, distressed Proctorites went so far as to seek
legislative abolition of the new county rather than give in
to the decision of the voters.
Kentuckians desired to live in new counties and county
seats because of the rich political and economic rewards
involved. A position in county government often meant
monetary as well as. political riches. The county court
formed the nucleus of county government. Until 1850,
the court was composed of the justices of the peace, who
dispensed much of the local political patronage as well as
performing a wide variety of significant governmental
business. Although an individual justice of the peace
commanded little in the way of income from fees, as a
member of the county court he often profited from the
sale of county office.
Theoretically, the governor appointed the justices of
the peace-approximately fifteen per county. But nor-
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mally he abided by the recommendations of the county
court justices themselves, who were bound to submit two
nominations to him for each vacancy. Traditionally the
governor selected the court's first choice unless the can-
didate was morally grotesque. If a justice of the peace sat
on the court long enough to become the senior justice, he
usually became the sheriff, since the county court con-
trolled nomination to this office as well; the court nomi-
nated two candidates for the sheriffalty to the governor
from among the members of the court itself, paying due
regard to seniority, and the governor almost always com-
missioned the senior justice of the court.
Before 1850, county courts appointed most of the other
officers of the county directly, without outside approval.
In addition to dispensing patronage, county courts sat as
the probate courts for the commonwealth, maintained
jurisdiction over orphans and apprentices, tried bastardy
cases, administered the poor laws, established ferries and
set their rates, and authorized the construction of
milldams. Perhaps most important, the county court and
other county officers set the county levy and collected
both county and state taxes. They also authorized the
construction of many of the state's roads and maintained
most of them. The court also paid the county's bills,
sitting as a claims court for this process. Much of this may
sound like routine business, but the nineteenth century
specialized in limited government, and in Kentucky
much of what was done by government was accom-
plished at the county level.
Constitutional reformers at mid-century established
the office of county judge, assigning him much of the
business previously conducted by the justices of the
peace collectively. The justices retained a limited posi-
tion on the court, sitting once or twice a year as a claims
court, which continued to set local taxes and supervise
the construction and maintenance of roads and public
buildings. The county judge probated wills, heard petty
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civil and criminal cases, and generally looked after the
judicial business of the county court.
Neither county judges nor justices of the peace had to
be trained in the law-and few of them were. Statistical
studies reveal that in the 1850s most justices of the peace
were farmers, with. a scattering of artisans, small busi-
nessmen, and lawyers. In rural counties county judges
tended to be farmers, while in more urban areas they
were more likely to be businessmen or, in a few cases,
attorneys. Throughout the nineteenth century, observers
complained about the caliber of justices of the peace.
Before 1850, the justices generally found themselves in
the upper half of the community's society and economy,
but performed their duties less than conscientiously.
Such dereliction helped produce the reforms of 1850.
After mid-century, the typical justice of the peace came
from a lower socioeconomic stratum than before and
executed his official duties even less competently. It was
sometimes said that not even God himself could guess
how a justice of the peace would decide a case. Often
devoid of legal logic, rulings of the justices sometimes
bordered on the bizarre. A Franklin County squire, upon
learning of the innocence of a man he had ordered
whipped for horse-stealing, said, "It's all right-the
fellow needed the thrashing anyhow." Another justice
ruled for both parties in a trespass suit, while a colleague
dissolved a marriage in the middle of a wife-beating trial
so that the wife could testify against her husband. Still
another forced a would-be wife to swear off other men
before marrying her to her suspicious suitor.
County judges maintained higher standards, although
some in smaller, poorer counties could not read or write.
Yet eccentric behavior sometimes characterized these
officials also. Benjamin F. Graves, for many years county
judge in Fayette County, remarked when awakened from
one of his frequent courtroom naps that he could hear as
well asleep as awake. The judge of the Kenton County
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Court created a monopoly in civil marriages by refusing
to grant the justices of the peace in his county the au-
thority to compete with him. When accused by counsel of
favoritism, a Bullitt County judge left the bench, soundly
thrashed his accuser, voluntarily appeared before a jus-
tice of the peace to be fined for disorderly conduct, and
then resumed the trial.
The sheriffs office, with its infinite responsibilities,
grew increasingly frustrating to occupants and clients
alike as the nineteenth century matured. The sheriff
collected county and state taxes, executed the orders of
the commonwealth's principal trial courts, served as chief
election officer of the county, and held primary responsi-
bility for law enforcement. He also sometimes acted as a
court-appointed estate administrator. In larger, more
prosperous counties, the office of sheriff could be one of
great profit and prestige, but in smaller, poorer places it
often represented a position of small income and great
chagrin. In economically stable counties, tax collecting
offered the greatest opportunity for sheriffs to earn sub-
stantial fees in the form of commissions, but it also pre-
sented the greatest hazard in the form of suits by the
commonwealth and county for delinquencies. Large
numbers of Kentuckians (up to 25 percent in some
counties) evaded taxes, and sheriffs remained liable for
much of their delinquency. Furthermore, the job of tax
collecting was a great deal more cumbersome than it is
today; sheriffs in most counties were forced to ride horse-
back from household to household, personally collecting
from each taxpayer. Sheriffs from various counties some-
times banded together to protest inadequate commis-
sions and antiquated collection methods, but partial re-
lief came only in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century. Until then, legislatures simply delayed the day
of final reckoning by postponing dates upon which
sheriffs had to settle their accounts with the state auditor
and providing other forms of temporary relief. One legis-
lature made the mistake of providing that counties could
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appoint special tax collectors in the event the sheriff
neglected his duties; because these collectors could
charge higher commissions for their services, many
sheriffs resigned their positions to secure appointment
either as the special tax collector or as his chief deputy.
Traditionally the principal law enforcement officer of
the commonwealth, the sheriff gradually came to ignore
his crime-fighting responsibilities as his other duties
multiplied. Ironically this happened at a time when
crime was on the increase, and thus semianarchy resulted
in many counties, especially during and after the Civil
War. Those sheriffs who did participate actively in law
enforcement often did so in a fraudulent manner, stage-
managing collusive crimes of a petty nature in order to
earn state fees for the apprehension and jailing of his
accomplices. In many feud-ridden communities sheriffs
either refused to confront armed gangs or themselves
joined and even led the desperadoes. In either case, local
crime fighting became a mockery and governors had to
restore order by means of the state militia.
The county clerkship normally attracted more compe-
tent occupants than the sheriffalty. The clerk of Jefferson
County reportedly earned $15,000 annually by 1850. But
in smaller counties it was usually necessary to secure an
additional appointment as clerk of the circuit court in
order to obtain a living wage. In smaller counties clerks
also sometimes engaged in the practice of law, attempting
to exploit the inherent advantages of their office. Legisla-
tures attempted to outlaw or limit this activity, but en-
joyed only incomplete success. By the second half of the
century, clerks found their jobs so complex that they
began organizing to seek legislative clarification and sim-
plification of their duties, again with only partial suc-
cess.
The other officers of late eighteenth-century and nine-
teenth-century Kentucky county government performed
more in the tradition of justices of the peace and sheriffs,
being generally less competent than county judges and
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clerks. Jailers tended to be far more interested in earning
fees than in holding their prisoners secure. Even in
smaller counties, the position was one of potentially
sizable profit because of the high incidence of crime.
Jailers earned fees not only from the county, but from
state and federal governments as well. Some jailers sup-
plemented their official income by selling liquor to pris-
oners, and a few collaborated in jail escapes in return for
pay-offs. Many in smaller counties maintained outside
occupations in addition to their official duties. A few
jailers qualified as genuine humanitarians; in Kenton
County one such officer left his trade as a blacksmith in
order to care for a sickly prisoner.
The offices of assessor and county attorney normally
attracted younger men eager for political advancement.
Their ambition and inexperience sometimes caused
them to perform less than effectively. This was especially
true of the assessors, who often underassessed in order to
curry favor from voters. Supporters of the county at-
torneys argued that their assistance often proved invalu-
able in successful criminal prosecutions by common-
wealth attorneys, but most observers concluded that
defense attorneys generally possessed superior abilities
in the courtroom.
Though possessed of a rich English tradition, the of-
fices of coroner, surveyor, and constable steadily de-
clined throughout the nineteenth century. The first two
became a joke in many counties and often went unfilled.
Few physicians aspired to coronerships, and those who
did were not infrequently accused of body-snatching.
Once an avenue to successful land speculation, the sur-
veyorship languished by mid-century and often attracted
only fledglings eager to bolster inadequate private prac-
tices. Theoretically law enforcement officers, constables
actually devoted most of their time to harassing debtors
and defendants. But at least until 1850, an enterprising
constable could bolster his annual income considerably
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by virtue of the fees he earned from his official debt-
collecting.
Even before the injection of popular democracy into
the selection process, politics played a major part in the
appointment of county officers. For most of the period
before 1850, the county court in effect picked not only its
own members, but virtually all other county officials as
well. Thus vacancies ·on the courts themselves inspired
much of the politicking. Although spirited battles for
these positions took place before the two-party system
came to Kentucky in 1827, competition afterward was
even keener. In many cases the question of which party
would control a particular county court was determined
almost immediately after organized political activity coa-
lesced around the candidacies of Andrew Jackson and
John Quincy Adams early in 1827 as a prelude to the
presidential election of 1828. And it sometimes hap-
pened that the political party controlling a county court
was not the one polling the most votes in the popular
elections of the county.
In Fayette County, for example, Jacksonian Demo-
crats, though largely unsuccessful at the ballot box, domi-
nated the county court. This control originated largely by
chance. In 1827 the Jacksonians happened to have a
majority on the court. During the next four years they took
care to bolster their narrow majority by filling all va-
cancies on the court with members of their own party. By
1831, the anti-Jacksonian newspapers of Lexington were
condemning the county court as "an irresponsible body
of aristocrats." Despite the denunciations and pleas for
more bipartisanship, the situation had not changed by
1845; of twenty-two justices, only three were members of
the Whig party. Democrats enjoyed similar successes in
other counties that usually voted Whig, such as Franklin,
Montgomery, and Woodford, while in Jacksonian Har-
rison County the Whigs dominated the court.
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Sometimes party struggles over the control of county
courts raged for several decades. Democrats did not seize
control of the Campbell County Court until 1840, and it
took a rump session of the county court for them to
accomplish this feat. Despite protests from his fellow
Whigs, Governor Robert Letcher acquiesced in the Dem-
ocratic coup. Seven years later the Whigs exacted a mea-
sure of revenge when they foisted one of their own party
members upon the Democratic majority in the guise of a
follower of the Jacksonian banner. But the Democrats
quickly retaliated the following year by securing the
appointment of a blazing partisan in the face of accusa-
tions by Whigs that he was not only capable of making
prejudicial rulings as a magistrate, but also quite in-
sane.
"Out" parties often attempted to lessen "in" party
domination of county courts by means of petitions to the
governor bolstered by the endorsements of mass meet-
ings. Sometimes dissidents demanded special referenda
to fill county court vacancies even though the constitution
and statutes did not require such a procedure. Public
demonstrations seldom influenced court appointments,
however, and when they did they sometimes produced
surprising results. In 1843, Mason County Whigs domi-
nated both the county court and the ballot box. Confid.ent
of victory, they agreed to the demands of Democrats and
held a special election to determine a particular neigh-
borhood's choice to fill a vacancy on the court. Much to
the dismay ofthe Whigs, a Democrat, strongly challenged
not only by a Whig but also by another Democratic
candidate, triumphed over all opposition. The Whig ma-
jority on the court quickly forgot its pledge to abide by the
outcome of the referendum and in the face of howls from
the Democrats filled the vacancy with a fellow party
member.
Not all political battles over county court vacancies
involved party politics. Since there was no requirement
that every section of a county should have membership
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on the court, geographical malapportionment plagued
many county neighborhoods. The problem was espe-
cially acute in Logan County. When the senior magistrate
of the county court resigned in 1845 to become sheriff,
residents ofan unrepresented region petitioned the court
to fill the vacancy from their neighborhood. Not only did
the court ignore the pleadings of the aggrieved district,
but it also delayed filling the vacancy until the retiree's
term as sheriff expired and then reappointed him to the
court.
Chicanery likewise characterized the appointments of
other county officers, especially sheriffs, clerks, and
constables. The tradition of awarding the sheriffalty to
the senior member of the county court encouraged an-
other antebellum Kentucky tradition-the selling of
public office. In the words of a newspaper of the time, a
sheriff-designate had to be equipped "to be moving con-
tinually on horseback, or on foot, in all sorts of weather,
over all sorts of roads, and sometimes at night, as well as
during the day." By the time a justice of the peace
reached a position of seniority on the court he was often
too old and feeble for such a strenuous life. The senior
magistrate of Henry County, asserting that he was "quite
an old man and in a very feeble state of health and
apprehending that he [would] live but a short time," sold
the sheriffalty to a deputy in 1843, and this was not an
unusual case.
Profit likewise influenced many senior justices to sell
the sheriffalty. Although illegal, such sales often took
place at public auctions with the office going to the
highest bidder, regardless ofhis place of residence, for as
much as $4,000. In early 1846, a combination of busi-
nessmen from Montgomery County known as "Richart,
Anderson and Company" purchased the sheriffalty of
Bourbon County one year in advance of commission.
When the time came in early 1847 for the buyers to
assume control of the sheriffalty in the person of their
senior partner, Richart, they appeared in the Bourbon
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County Court with their lawyer and demanded that the
incumbent sheriff and his deputies surrender all unfin-
ished business. When the court refused to grant the
purchasers' request, they threatened to bring suit in the
circuit court. The group secured the office despite com-
plaints from county residents that Richart was "superan-
nuated" and predictions that he would "clog the wheels
of litigation" and fail to enforce the laws.
Political entrepreneurs also bought and sold the offices
of county clerk, deputy sheriff, and constable. Of these
the clerkship brought the highest prices, ranging from
more than $10,000 in populous Jefferson County to less
than $1,000 in smaller counties. As in the case of sold
sheriffalties, law enforcement officers seldom if ever
prosecuted parties to such transactions even though they
patently violated criminal statutes. The only recorded
litigation took the form of civil suits to enforce sale and
leasehold agreements, some of which resembled compli-
cated real estate transactions. In 1816, John D. Young,
clerk of the Fayette County Court, leased his office to
Abner Fields for one year at a price of $1,000. Before the
end of the period of the lease, Young sold the office to
James C. Rodes for $6,000. Rodes thereupon paid the
lessee, Fields, $400 in the form of eight $50 notes in
return for the latter's promise to execute all the business
ofthe clerk's office until the expiration ofhis lease. Fields
assigned some of the notes to Thomas auton, and when
Rodes refused to satisfy them, Outon sued him and won a
judgment. Rodes then sought to enjoin enforcement of
the judgment on the grounds that Fields had failed to
perform the duties of his office. The Court of Appeals
refused to issue an injunction because the original con-
tract was against public policy.
Kentucky's antebellum county politicians did not re-
serve all of their shenanigans for appointment battles;
fights over removals also claimed a good share. Some
county offices were not protected by constitutional or
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statutory guarantees of definite tenure; the jailership, for
example, remained vulnerable to political attack because
of vague statutory language. Scheming politicans eagerly
preyed upon incumbents who blocked their path to pa-
tronage and power. One such episode occurred in
Franklin County in 1845 and 1846.
Predictably the conflicting ambitions of local politi-
cians sparked the Franklin County jailership donny-
brook. Benjamin Luckett, a member of the county court,
applied for a deputy postmastership of Frankfort, placing
himself in competition with several other party members
of the county. In order to remove Luckett from this
competition and to speed up the process of succession to
the sheriffalty (Luckett had considerable seniority on the
county court), Luckett's colleagues on the court offered to
appoint him jailer if he resigned from the court and
withdrew his application to the post office. Although
Luckett agreed to this, the incumbent jailer, Thomas A.
Gorham, did not. Probably the Democratic majority on
the court did not even consult Gorham, who was a Whig.
Scarcely affording Gorham an opportunity to defend his
office, the county court abruptly removed him from office
in June 1845 for "divers good causes." Gorham appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which ruled the county's action
invalid on the grounds that the jailer was entitled to a full
hearing.
Undaunted by the seeming reversal of their carefully
laid plans, the county magistrates refused to enter the
high tribunal's ruling in their order book, and Luckett
would not give Gorham back the key to the jail. After
several months of hesitation, the Court of Appeals jailed
almost half of the Franklin County justices for contempt
of court, while the Whig legislature, not to be outdone,
passed a statute making the usurpation of office a crime.
Unfortunately for the Whigs and Gorham, the offending
Franklin County magistrates were confined in Mr.
Luckett's jail. After residing there for several days, they
petitioned each other for writs ofhabeas corpus and, after
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brief hearings marked by more tittering than argumenta-
tion, ordered Luckett to free them on the grounds that
they were being held in jail contrary to law. Gorham
completed the farce by suddenly resigning the jailership
he no longer held, thus allowing Luckett and the Franklin
County Democracy to evade the decrees of the highest
court of the commonwealth and a statute of the General
Assembly.
The democratic revolution of 1850 that made almost all
county offices elective did not alter local Kentucky poli-
tics significantly. The sale of office gave way to the sale of
votes. Voting continued to be done by voice rather than
ballot until the end of the nineteenth century, making it a
simple matter to enforce agreements to vote for particular
candidates. It was common for candidates to employ
professional vote-buyers to round up voters at strategic
moments on election day. Sometimes professionals
brought in wagonloads of voters from other counties,
although such practices obviously were illegal. The smart
vote-seller waited until a close election neared comple-
tion and then 'sold his vote for a much higher price than it
would have commanded earlier in the day. Prices for
votes ranged from two to fifty dollars. Candidates also
employed large amounts of liquor in their quest for office,
and some floated to victory. Grayson County Republicans
enjoyed unprecedented success at the polls in 1886 when
they rented an entire saloon on election day. Prohibition-
ists in Clark County sought to counteract drinking at the
polls by providing voters free ice cream.
Vast quantities of free liquor and the often intensely
competitive nature of many county elections meant that
many election days were the scenes of drunken brawls,
maimings, and even killings. Newspaper correspondents
expressed surprise when they could report no deaths or
serious fights on election day. A reporter in Spring Lick
wrote that the whole town was drunk and disorderly
during the elections of 1882. Obviously such outrages
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produced demands for modern-day laws against the sale
of alcoholic beverages on election day.
Drafters of the Constitution of 1850, while providing
that county officials should be elected, did not specify
how they should be nominated, and critics began to com-
plain after the Civil War that the traditional method of
party nomination by convention rendered the democratic
revolution incomplete. Most charged that popular pri-
maries furnished the only method of insuring that the
people had a direct voice in the selection of local officials.
Under the prevailing system, they maintained, political
bosses, tricksters, and so-called courthouse cliques con-
trolled the nominating process. Conventions lent them-
selves to orators and wire-pullers and attracted few but
sordid professionals; primaries would give every voter an
equal opportunity to influence nominations. In one-party
counties (there were a good number of these following
the Civil War), those who determined nominations de-
cided who would be county officers.
Defenders of the old order countered that popular
primaries would be unmanageable, affording an opportu-
nity for members of the opposition to infiltrate the polls
and influence the nomination. Such dissidents would
certainly opt for the weakest candidate. What damage
they did not do would come at the hands of the general
riffraff who would participate in primaries as a lark.
Furthermore, primaries would produce divisiveness
within party ranks and allow minority candidates to run in
the general election. Cries of cliques, rings, and bosses
were simply the exaggerations of"out" politicians trying
to get into power.
Those favoring popular primaries generally prevailed
in the battles over nominating procedures which afflicted
many counties after the Civil War, and many of the evils
forecast by critics ofprimaries materialized. In Pendleton
County's primary of 1878, the local newspaper 'reported
that scores of outsiders and opposition party members
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voted and that candidates using the most money and
dispensing the most whiskey emerged victorious. Similar
scenes in other places prompted parties in some counties
to secure special legislation from the General Assembly
authorizing them to regulate primaries more closely and
to impose criminal sanctions on violators of party rules.
Finally, in 1892, the legislature enacted a law regulating
party primaries wherever held.
Controversy over methods of nomination did nothing
to dampen the traditional Kentucky fervor for politicking
and the seeking of political office. Observers noted an
obsession motivating hordes of persons to seek county
office who "would not otherwise descend into the cess-
pool of politics." In the opinion of the Boone County
Recorder, many sought office "in the hope ofbeing aided
in providing for their families by the salaries paid these
offices." Ironically, the paper noted, the least lucrative
offices seemed to attract the greatest number of can-
didates. Reporting from Green County, a correspondent
wrote that most of the candidates for county office in 1878
emphasized their need for sustenance rather than their
qualifications for office. Appalled by the mad scramble
for office, the Kentucky Gazette of Lexington denounced
the tendency of candidates for county office to conduct
prolonged campaigns, some of which lasted over a year.
But such condemnations did little good, and nineteenth-
century Kentuckians remained dedicated to their favorite
pastime-politicking.
Although cynics, especially those tied to the establish-
ment, often branded talk about "cliques" and "rings" as
the myth-making diatribes of "out" politicans trying to
get into power, the county courthouse gangs of the nine-
teenth century were more than mere figments of the
imagination. County officers, especially justices of the
peace and sheriffs, held positions of party leadership in
many counties during the period of the first and second
state constitutions. After 1850, the relative power of
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county officers within county political machines de-
clined, but certain members of the county government
nonetheless remained influential. Candidates for elected
office especially catered to the sheriff, who as chief elec-
tion officer and enforcer of civil and criminal judgments
could be very persuasive at the polls. And after the office
of county judge was created in 1850, these officials ob-
tained considerable political power and often com-
manded the unofficial title of "political boss" of the
county, a position many maintain even to this day. In
short, counties constituted not only the governmental
foundation of nineteenth-century Kentucky, but its polit-
ical base as well.
2SOCIAL ORDER
A GREAT MANY ASPECTS ofthe daily lives ofnineteenth-
century Kentuckians fell under the regulation of county
governments. As the exclusive probate courts ofthe state,
county courts annually controlled millions of dollars of
property. Critics accused the courts of negligence and
even fraud in the handling of estates. Courts took too long
to distribute property, they said, stalling settlements in
order to extract exorbitant fees for themselves and their
cronies whom they installed as administrators and ap-
praisers. Many contestants in probate conflicts found it
necessary to appeal rulings of the courts to higher tribu-
nals, but such actions afforded little effective relief and
mainly served to prolong disputes. At both constitutional
conventions held in the nineteenth century, efforts to
transfer probate jurisdiction from the county courts to
special tribunals failed despite continued criticism.
In an age of high mortality, the court's jurisdiction over
guardians and orphans affected thousands of homeless
children, some with rather large holdings that needed
protection and supervision. Yet for all their potential as
conservators of these often helpless waifs, the tribunals
too willingly acquiesced, either through negligence or
collaboration, in the thievery of unscrupulous guard-
ians.
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Akin to their powers over guardians and orphans was
county governments' jurisdiction over masters and ap-
prentices. The relationship of master and apprentice is
unfamiliar to modern Americans, but it was a vital part of
nineteenth-century society; apprenticeship was by far
the most popular way of training youth in skilled trades.
County courts had to approve indentures of apprentice-
ship and reserved the right to fine or remove negligent or
repressive masters. Thus the courts in a real sense com-
prised the most important judicial overseer of labor rela-
tions in nineteenth-century Kentucky.
So, too, the farmer and miller went to the county court
for permission to construct milldams for the gristmills
where most of Kentucky's grain was ground in the nine-
teenth century. As the agency in charge of licensing and
regulating milldams, the counties considered not only
the potential effects of dams on neighboring property but
also rudimentary questions of ecology. Since the county
court also had jurisdiction over poaching, it was in many
ways the most effective instrulnent of conservation in the
commonwealth.
In the absence offederal or even state programs (except
for the handicapped), health and welfare concerns re-
sided almost exclusively in the counties. Counties were
the principal administrators of the nation's poor laws well
into the twentieth century. What little concern govern-
ments had for health matters manifested itself most often
at the. county level. County courts issued emergency
decrees during epidemics of smallpox and cholera, and
many eventually established departments of health to
look after the more routine needs of their citizens. When-
ever their business concerned estates, apprenticeships,
guardianships, relief of the poor, or milldams, nine-
teenth-century Kentuckians depended on their counties
for assistance and guidance. And these concerns were a
vital part of the authority of nineteenth-century govern-
ment.
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Court day likewise highlighted the economic and so-
cial importance of counties in nineteenth-century Ken-
tucky. Originally a Monday devoted primarily to govern-
mental and judicial business, court day evolved into that
day of the month during which most county residents
shopped, bought and sold, bartered, drank, gossiped,
fought, and competed in various athletic contests. County
courts continued to convene on court day, but their busi-
ness contributed in diminishing degree to the day's fes-
tivities.
In central Kentucky especially, court day became the
day on which most of the region's livestock was sold.
Famed Kentucky author James Lane Allen contended
that the area was "the great livestock market ofthe West."
Farmers herded their livestock onto roads and turnpikes
and, amidst swirling clouds of dust, drove them to court
day auctions. In some county seats, especially Lexington,
the occasion attracted so many animals that city residents
began to demand restrictions on, or even elimination of,
the sales.
Paris in Bourbon County (where the stock sales ap-
parently originated) and Lexington were the principal
stock centers of the Bluegrass. As was typical of such
events, Lexington's court day also attracted countless
other commercial and social activities, and by the end of
the Civil War it was a scene ofanimated chaos. Producing
a stench that reportedly could cause "a strong, well man"
to vomit as he walked the streets, the livestock accounted
for most of the growing complaints about Fayette County
court day. On rainy days the animals, together with the
thousands ofhuman onlookers, turned muddy streets into
quagmires. Women dared not venture too far from the
shops they frequented for fear of being shouldered about
by the teeming crowd. Gathering for the most part in the
public square on Cheapside, the "nuisance" of the live-
stock had become a "calamity" by 1870 and produced a
clamor for restrictions. Some residents demanded that
the city construct pens in the public square; others ar-
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gued for better traffic control (it was not unusual for two or
more large herds to meet head-on); and more and more
advocated moving the sales outside of town.
Early in that year, the city of Lexington reluctantly
agreed to experiment with suburban livestock sales. De-
clining profits soon prompted downtown merchants to
demand a return ofthe sales to Cheapside, and by the end
of the year the city fathers had restored the old system.
Nonetheless, agitation for a permanent removal of the
sales-and the "peculiar and pungent ammonia" they
created-continued throughout the decade. Ultimately
the city council outlawed downtown cattle and hog auc-
tions; although Cheapside merchants once more com-
plained about declining sales, the change remained per-
manent.
Horsemen found court day greatly to their liking. In all
counties residents swapped horses, and in many they
conducted formal sales and shows. Fayette County
boasted the most elaborate display of horses and was
especially noted for fine trotters. By 1870, the Lexington
show attracted horsemen not only from all parts of the
United States but from the rest ofthe world as well. Races
also contributed to the excitement ofthis and other shows
and ranged from informal, impromptu dashes to more
carefully staged affairs. Unlike other events of court day
in Lexington, the Fayette County horse show continued
well into the twentieth century and its offspring thrives
even today.
Livestock dealers were not the only ones conducting
business on court day. Entrepreneurs of all kinds flocked
to county seats on this day of the month. Among others,
patent medicine men, lightning rod salesmen, bookmen,
and lumber dealers could be seen eagerly hawking their
wares on street corners, in the middle of sidewalks, or in
the thick of drifting crowds. Perhaps most important in
the vast array of salesmen was the auctioneer, whose
barking added to the day's cacophony and whose wares
ranged from livestock and real estate to furniture and
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slaves. Kentuckians conducted so much of their business
on court day that it took a Court of Appeals ruling to
establish that foreclosure sales were valid even though
not held on the traditional Monday.
Court day also represented a major social event, al-
lowing rural and urban residents alike an opportunity to
swap the day's news over glasses of punch. Observers
noted that democracy characterized the day's socializing,
with little attention paid to rank or economic position.
Liquor and the Kentuckian's predilection for indiscrimi-
nate titling doubtless facilitated this leveling process. A
postwar correspondent for the New York Times marveled
at the number ofmilitary officers present at a court day he
attended and speculated that it would be easier to find
"John Smith in New York City" than "Squire or Judge
Somebody in the crowd."
Often intimidated by brawling, drunken men, smelly
cows, and sprays of tobacco juice, women found refuge in
shops that faced the public square or in nearby churches
where they conducted bake sales and public dinners to
raise funds for charity. In February 1873, the ladies of a
Presbyterian church of Lexington announced in a local
newspaper that they wished all of their rural neighbors to
remember they could "get a good dinner without deten-
tion . . . in Mr. Long's building on the corner ofCheap-
side and Short Street," while the ladies of a Baptist
church held "an elegant dinner" at the April court of the
same year.
Would-be athletes frequently gathered on court day to
fight, race, or engage in other contests. Competition
varied from sledge throwing and bar heaving to foot-
racing and cockfighting. Fisticuffs drew the most atten-
tion, ranging from spontaneous drunken brawls to staged
affairs involving only two contestants and a semblance of
refereeing. In some places the intake of alcoholic bever-
ages took on many of the characteristics of an athletic
competition. Although counties and towns attempted to
restrict its sale and consumption after the Civil War,
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liquor remained a highly popular item at most court days
throughout the nineteenth century.
Drawn by the presence of captive audiences, politi-
cians flocked to court days. They often proclaimed their
speeches to be spontaneous responses to popular de-
mands for elucidation of current issues, but court day
orators seldom delivered any remarks that had not been
carefully thought out beforehand. Those who took the
stump usually employed agents to gather crowds, and
some even hired claques. Barbecues and burgoos some-
times embellished the politicking. The day also pre-
sented an excellent occasion for more formal political
meetings such as conventions.
Competition between neighboring counties' court
days remained lively throughout much of the nineteenth
century. Often the entire economy of a county depended
upon the success of the occasion and this in turn usually
depended on strategic scheduling. Ifa county's court day
came at the same time as that of a nearby county with
more facilities and attractions, economic disaster could
quickly result. Finding that their day conflicted with
those of Fayette, Nicholas, and Grant counties, officials of
Harrison County successfully petitioned the legislature
for a change of date (despite the resentment of tradition-
alists) and happily reported the economic revival that
soon resulted. Counties often engaged in bragging con-
tests over the relative merits of their court days. Its
neighbors denounced Bourbon County's braggadocio
and contended that their own court days were every bit
as spectacular. The Cynthiana News asserted that Bour-
bonites actually envied Harrison County and that such
envy was well founded, since Harrison's court day ex-
celled in every way except for numbers of "long-eared
animals ... both of quadrupeds and bipeds."
Court day remained popular in most counties
throughout the nineteenth century. Occasional flu and
cholera epidemics kept attendance down in certain
counties, and, of course, the war interfered from time to
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time in battle areas. But even then, crowds gathered in
the public square to exchange the latest news as soon as
the noise of battle abated.
The introduction of the automobile signaled the de-
cline and fall ofcourt day as a major institution in the lives
ofKentuckians. The event did not die without resistance,
anguish, and controversy, however. Fayette County's
conflict in the early 1920s best illustrates this painful
process. Supported by steady agitation from women's
groups and various other organizations of "forward-
movers," a grand jury in the fall of 1920 found court day to
be a "nuisance" and indicted the city of Lexington for
"maintaining" it. In the trial held a year later, a circuit
court jury (which included three farmers) found the city
guilty, and the judge soon afterward ordered the city "not
to permit bartering, trading, selling or dealing in wares,
goods, merchandize, mules, horses or any articles" on or
in the vicinity of Cheapside, the area of the public square
where the main events of court day traditionally oc-
curred. City authorities, most of whom welcomed the
decision, announced they would not appeal the order.
Far less acquiescent, the Fayette County Fiscal Court
voted to fight the order, contending it was invalid since
Cheapside was part of the courthouse square and the
county, not the city, owned the square. The grand jury
should have indicted the county instead of the city, and
therefore the order was ineffectual. The Fayette County
Farmers' Union joined the fiscal court's effort to prevent
enforcement of the order, declaring that Cheapside was
"the only place [farmers] had to do a little business in the
city." A spokesman for the union bitterly announced that
he now knew what the expression "back to the country"
really meant. "It is a hint to the farmers to stay in the
country and not bother the city with their presence."
Other farmers alluded to a conflict between town and
country in even more direct terms. A neighboring Wood-
ford County farmer, Bill Hayden, in a letter to the Lex-
ington Herald described city dwellers as "kid gloved
24
geraniums" and "tenderfoots." Hayden alleged that the
farmers of Fayette County and environs accounted for the
greatness of Lexington, supporting her retail establish-
ments and developing her most important industries
(horses and tobacco). Hayden pictured city dwellers
cowering by warm fires while manly farmers braved
intemperate weather to harvest crops, breed animals, and
make progress. Vowing that the farmers would never give
up Cheapside, he urged his city neighbors to "pull to-
gether for a better court day and a better market."
Echoing the charge ofurban hypocrisy and elaborating
upon the theme of town versus country, a rural "citizen"
contrasted the alleged "stench" of court day livestock
with the "moral stench" of city mores. In his opinion,
Lexingtonians should spend less time complaining about
the habits of farmers and more time getting rid of "the
vamps-male and female-who walk around trying to
trap the innocent." So evil was the city that a "citizen"
claimed to know a young man who had come to Lexington
to study, arriving "a clean boy" and leaving "diseased."
Others took up the cudgel for court day. A newspaper
editor from Jessamine County admitted that Fayette
County's court day created minor confusion but con-
tended that "a few hours of noisy trafficking" were more
than offset by the rich tradition of the event and the
contribution of its participants to the city's economy.
Seizing upon the economic impact of court day, the
Farmers' Union submitted affidavits to the circuit court
from several city merchants attesting to the profits they
derived from the monthly crowds. Another fundamental
issue raised by the court day controversy was mentioned
in a letter to the Herald. Although a city resident, the
writer denounced Lexington's capitulation to the au-
tomobile, because ofwhose reckless drivers people could
not "safely walk the streets at all."
Although less vocal, critics of court day rallied to the
defense of the grand jury and circuit court. They con-
tended that the event was no longer an occasion for the
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exchange offarm goods and animals, but had degenerated
into "an open market for old junk." Countering the dec-
larations of merchants who saw a profit in court day,
some Cheapside residents tesitifed that their property
values declined as a result of the monthly gatherings. To
these critics, court day represented an outdated tradition,
interfering with city life, progress, and, above all, the
automobile. They demanded not only that court day be
ended, but that Cheapside be converted into a parking
lot.
Most city people probably shared the ambivalent atti-
tude of the editorial writer for the Herald who character-
ized court day as "one of the most picturesque and at the
same time grotesque features of community life in the
Blue Grass." Despite its continuing charm, the journalist
pronounced its liabilities excessive. It had "grown
beyond governable proportions."
As country and city folk traded shots in the local news-
papers and meeting places, some of the principal actors of
the drama attempted to resolve the conflict. The Farmers'
Union, despite defiant cries from a few of its members
urging the fencing off of the public square from the city,
instructed its attorney to seek a compromise with the
circuit judge, a cour&e of action also endorsed by the
county judge, who had been working diligently in behalf
of the preservation of court day. The two sides main-
tained an uneasy truce for more than two years. In No-
vember 1924 the county judge himself, weary of the
continuing controversy, finally ordered court day discon-
tinued. While some magistrates grumbled about not
being consulted and several farmers growled about the
demise of their monthly gatherings, the judge's order
escaped serious challenge. A rural poet had unwittingly
written court day's epitaph several years before while
defending the sacred rural institution:
Thus, C heapside, thou art fated,
Old landmark of atime.
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Ah! Thy prestige stands abated,
Thou'rt accus'd ofnovel crime.
Behold! Thou art now indicted.
(Stand'st defendant at the bar.)
Alas! Thy fair name's now blighted.
Sullied by the autocar.
By 1940, court day had all but vanished in most
counties. It persisted in some ofthe more rural areas until
after World War II, but by 1960 it existed in only a handful
of counties and was usually held only annually and on
days not associated with the meeting of the county
court.
3WAR AGAINST
THE CITY
kROUGHOUT THE nineteenth century, Kentuckians re-
mained county-oriented, more loyal to these local units of
government than to towns or to state and national govern-
ment. Some county-worshipers even advocated abol-
ishing towns as unnecessarily complicating the local con-
stitution. Usually relations between counties and towns
remained harmonious, but occasionally towns bridled
over the domination of counties, which retained more
governing authority under the constitution and statutes.
In a few instances townsfolk obtained important conces-
sions from the General Assembly, and the frustrated
county politicians then staged revolts of their own. Such
episodes occurred within a few months of each other in
Fayette and Jefferson counties.
Although it had lost out commercially to Louisville in
the 1820s, Lexington nonetheless became a semi-inde-
pendent municipal corporation in 1831 by virtue of a
special charter granted by the General Assembly. Chief
among the new city's autonomous features were its sepa-
rate judiciary and its immunity from county taxation. The
former freed the city fathers from dependence upon the
county for law enforcement, while the latter not only
expanded significantly the city's taxing potential but al-
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so eliminated a major grievance that had persisted
throughout the period of Lexington's status as a town-
namely, that town residents paid taxes to the county
without receiving significant benefits. The charter also
had other provisions that expanded the powers of Lex-
ington at the expense of Fayette County; the city could,
for example, open its own poorhouse, appoint its own
food inspectors, and license taverns within its bounda-
ries.
During the next five years, relations between town and
country, which had been relatively amicable, de-
teriorated steadily. Its revenues sagging as the result of
Lexington's newly won financial independence, the
county court unsuccessfully petitioned the General As-
sembly in 1833 for a statute that would have applied all
fines received by the city court "to the use ofthe county of
Fayette in lessening the county levy." Two years later the
city, faced with an early energy crisis, sought to hold
down the rising price of wood (upon which its residents
largely depended for fuel) by establishing uniform stand-
ards of weight and maximum prices. Outraged both by
accusations that they were deliberately short-weighting
their cords of wood and by the attempts to deny them
windfall profits in a period ofenergy shortage, the farmers
of Fayette County petitioned the city government for
repeal of the obnoxious wood ordinance. City residents,
in turn, held meetings at which they praised the ordi-
nance, denounced the alleged price-gouging of wood
sellers, and proposed the incorporation of a municipal
fuel company to· import wood and coal, making Lexing-
tonians less dependent on county wood dealers. Un-
daunted by this consumer revolt, wood sellers held meet-
ings of their own, submitting that their "individual
rights" were being denied and threatening to boycott city
merchants if the ordinance was not repealed.
Eventually the city repealed the ordinance, but this did
not lessen tensions between Lexington and Fayette
County. Early in 1836, Thomas Hickey, judge of the
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Fayette County Circuit Court, precipitated another con-
frontation between the two units of local government, the
seriousness of which greatly exceeded that of the wood
controversy. Hickey ruled that the judiciary of Lexington
was unconstitutional, on the grounds that the judge was
not appointed for life as the state constitution provided.
The city charter vested judicial powers in the mayor who
was in effect elected for a one-year term. Strangely, no
one had bothered to challenge the validity of the munic-
ipal court, even though its deficiency seemed obvious,
until one Nelson Turner did so in late 1835. Lexington's
mayor-judge, James E. Davis, fined Turner, a farmer and
resident ofthe county, fifty dollars for breach ofthe peace.
Rather than pay the fine, Turner went to jail and appealed
the decision to the circuit court. Judge Hickey's decision
freed Turner and voided the city court's authority.
Stripped of their city court, Lexington officials soon
appealed to the General Assembly for relief. The legisla-
ture quickly responded to the city's plight, but in a
manner so unique that it threatened the very existence of
the community as a municipal corporation. Instead of
creating a new judicial position, the legislature removed
executive responsibilities from the mayor and made him
a life-appointed judicial officer. It transferred the mayor's
administrative duties to the president of the city council.
Governor James T. Morehead then reappointed as mayor
his fellow Whig James E. Davis, and the city council
promptly elected Thomas Hart, also active in Whig poli-
tics and a nephew of Henry Clay's wife, its president.
These developments presented Fayette County Dem-
ocrats with an opportunity to undermine their Whig op-
ponents and brought to a head the tensions between the
two parties and between the separate units of local gov-
ernment. Such tensions resulted naturally from the polit-
ical complexion of the city and county governments.
Taking advantage of their majority at the inception of
two-party politics in 1827, Democrats on the county court
nominated only fellow party members to fill vacancies, so
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that by 1836 they maintained almost complete control of
the tribunal. All ofthis particularly galled the Whigs, who
maintained a decisive advantage at the ballot box both
within the city and in the county at large. As the most
popular political party, they naturally controlled the gov-
ernment of Lexington, whose officials were mostly
elected rather than appointed. City Democrats, on the
other hand, waged spirited battles to overthrow their
Whig oppressors and accused them of using fraudulent
tactics to win elections. As ifto support these accusations,
Whigs in 1834 engineered the elimination of ward voting
for councilmen in order to minimize Democratic domina-
tion ofthe first ward and further reduce their participation
on the council. Thus by 1836, each party controlled a local
unit of government and harbored thoughts of revenge
against the opposition. Relying on the unpopularity ofthe
city charter's bizarre revisions (which seemed to many to
be nothing more than a crude attempt by the Whigs to
entrench themselves further in the halls of city govern-
ment), the Democrats would strike first.
Led by General John McCalla, a party leader on both
the county and the state level and a federal marshal since
Andrew Jackson's accession to the White House, the
Democrats began circulating a petition calling for the
complete repeal of the Lexington city charter, a move
designed to weaken the Whigs and enhance the powers of
the Democratic county court. Simultaneously the edito-
rial cannonades ofanother prominent Democrat began to
be heard. Daniel Bradford, editor of the venerable Ken-
tucky Gazette and a member of the county court, was
embittered by his recent loss to Davis in the election for
mayor and relished the opportunity to lash out at the
scheming Whigs. Early in February, Bradford's paper
accused the Whigs of conspiring to undermine popular
control of the city government and of pocketing city
funds; and at the same time the paper endorsed the
attempt to repeal the city charter.
After gathering a large number of signatures on their
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petitions, Democrats presented them to the legislature,
seeYing a statute repealing the city charter. The Whig
assembly would have none of this, but after some jock-
eying finally consented to a compromise measure pro-
viding for a special referendum by which Lexington
voters would determine the fate of the municipal corpora-
tion. As the date for the special election approached, both
sides intensified their campaigns.
In many respects the issue involved not simply the
status of Lexington but the rivalry of city versus county.
Whig city fathers could be seen at street corners ardently
extolling the virtues oftheir municipal corporation, while
Democratic county officers just as zealously supported
the drive to repeal. Midway in the campaign, in another
move to embarrass their adversaries, some of the Demo-
crats on the county court sought unsuccessfully to remove
Davis from the tribunal on the grounds that he could not
be both mayor and justice of the peace at one time.
Appointed to the court before the emergence of well-
defined political parties, Davis was one of the few Whig
members of county government. Whigs correctly
branded the maneuver to unseat Davis as blatantly par-
tisan, pointing out that Democrats had tolerated Davis's
plural office-holding for more than a year before sud-
denly deciding it was illegal.
Whigs pointed to other Democratic hypocrisies. Daniel
Bradford had earlier opposed an abortive attempt to oust
Davis as mayor and to repeal the city charter. Far better,
he had counseled, to elect a new mayor at the next
election, who would remedy the evils that Davis had
allegedly engendered. Not surprisingly, Bradford him-
self soon thereafter became a candidate for mayor, and at
no time in that campaign did he support repeal of the city
charter. Bradford had also served as the appointed city
clerk throughout 1835, never complaining about the defi-
ciencies of city government and relying almost entirely
on his deputy to carry out his official duties. Another
leading repealer, Dr. Caleb W. Cloud, had served for
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many years on the old town board oftrustees and later was
a member of the city council. In 1822, he had led an
attempt to force the county to sell to the town part of the
public square (traditionally counties owned the public
square of county seats). And even more ironically, as a
member of the city council Cloud had introduced the
resolution specifying the controversial charter revision
after Judge Hickey had invalidated the city judiciary.
Apparently Cloud's failure to win reelection to the
council in early 1836 prompted him to shift his priorities
dramatically.
Partisans on each side echoed the theme of city versus
county. Charterites predicted catastrophe if Lexington
lost her status as a municipal corporation. The county
court would once again have a hand in administering
town business and it would do so incompetently, its
members already overburdened with other responsibil-
ities and taxed with an inefficient organization. At a
public meeting held shortly before the special election
Daniel Mayes, a prominent Whig lawyer from Lexington,
pointed to the hypocrisy of county court members who
were denouncing the undemocratic city judiciary, but
who themselves sat on a self-perpetuating tribunal.
Mayes and others also emphasized that the county would
once again tax city residents, should voters repeal the
· charter. City partisans also complained that loss of cor-
poration status would make Lexington more dependent
on the county's ineffective law enforcement.
Repealers countered that city officials operated the
least effective and most repressive system of law enforce-
ment. Although the city court handed out severe judg-
ments compelling the convicted to pay exorbitant fines
and court costs and to serve lengthy sentences in the city
workhouse, the city police seldom solved more serious
crimes. Charter opponents also submitted that the cost of
city government climbed annually without attendant
benefits. They clamored for a return to the good old days
of less government and lower taxes.
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Although they were unable to vote in the special elec-
tion, county residents eagerly joined in the debate over
the merits of the charter, mostly on the side of the re-
pealers. Dependent upon Lexington as a market for their
surplus timber, rural residents still resented the attempts
of the city government to regulate the selling of wood.
Asserting that most farmers were deeply offended by the
"extravagances" of the amended city charter, one of the
Gazette's correspondents argued that repeal provided
the only sure way to restore harmony between town and
countryside. Another predicted that unless they were
restrained by the voters, the city fathers would soon pass
new ordinances encroaching upon the liberties of rural
entrepreneurs and might even compel them to tip their
hats to urban "aristocrats." Others expressed their agree-
ment with these writers, contending that repeal would
bring some humility back to the power-hungry corps of
city officials.
Despite all of the oratory and printed invective, the
repealers narrowly failed in their attempt to return Lex-
ington to the status of an unincorporated town under the
control of the county court. By a vote of379 to 323 the city
residents rejected the attempt to repeal. Undaunted, op-
ponents of the city did not abandon their war on the
revised charter. Citing the closeness of the vote, they
maintained that the charterites must offer some conces-
sions in order to placate the sizable minority that still
resented city policy. Several Democratic candidates for
the legislature pledged to continue the fight for repeal. In
spite of their victory, charterites appeared conciliatory in
the autumn of 1836, and shortly thereafter the new Gen-
eral Assembly revised the city charter in ways meeting
most of the demands of the dissidents. The revision
created a separate judge of the city court, restored the
mayor to his position as chief executive of the city, and
revived the ward system of representation on the city
council. The ease with which the combatants achieved
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their compromise markedly contrasted with the intensity
of their previous battles.
Fayette County and Lexington were not alone in their
struggle over political supremacy within the local consti-
tution. Jefferson County and Louisville confronted one
another in a similar dispute in 1835. At issue in this
episode was control of the public square. The county
owned the buildings on the square but shared their
occupation with the city. Because of the delapidated
condition of these structures, new ones would have to be
built, but the two governments disagreed over the
method of financing the construction. The county argued
that the city should share the cost of construction but not
the ownership of the buildings. The city contended that
either the county alone should pay for the construction or
it should give the public square to the city, which would
then pay for the new buildings and lease parts of them to
the county. County officials rejected both proposals, la-
beling them inequitable and illegal.
Faced with county intransigence and bolstered by
public displeasure over the run-down condition of the
county-city buildings, city politicians launched a cam-
paign for Louisville to secede from Jefferson County and
become a separate county. They arranged to have the
necessary legislation introduced into the General As-
sembly and began a public relations drive in Louisville
newspapers. It soon became evident that the secession
effort was being directed by Louisville Whigs who were
increasingly frustrated by the Democratic domination of
Jefferson County government. Complementing its cam-
paign for a new county, the Whig newspaper, the Louis-
ville Journal, blasted Worden Pope, accusing the promi-
nent Democratic politician of controlling county
government with the aid of his large family. So en-
trenched were the Popes, the Journal lamented sarcasti-
cally, that it was a shame the family was "not prolific
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enough to furnish a great lazy, lubberly boy for every
office, not only in the ... county, but throughout the
state." The paper then gleefully noted that since most of
the Popes resided in the city, they would have to move or
compete with the rest of the city residents for places in
the government of the new county.
County partisans publicly deplored the effort to create
another county, arguing that taxes would soar in both
Jefferson County and Louisville and that secession was
unconstitutional. Privately, county officials hastily strove
for a compromise, which was achieved after the two sides
agreed to the appointment of a joint committee. The
committee settled upon a formula to divide the expenses
of construction, the public square remained county prop-
erty, and the legislature allowed the Louisville County
bill to lapse. Periodically throughout the remainder ofthe
century Louisville and Jefferson County fought over the
public square. In 1868, after negotiations failed, the
county levied a tax against the city for a share ofconstruc-
tion costs for a new jail. The city refused to pay the tax but
finally came to terms with the county. Tensions between
town and country sporadically flared up in Fayette
County also, with geographical representation in county
government arousing the most conflict. After the Civil
War, county residents continually complained that the
city controlled more and more of the county offices. But
despite these complaints, Lexington continued its ascen-
dancy in county government throughout most of the re-
mainder of the century.
Although two of the commonwealth's most important
counties experienced a good deal of conflict, relations
between town and country were hannonious in most
parts of the state. And in most communities the county
remained supreme in the hearts and affairs of their inhab-
itants.
4CONFLICT AND
LAWLESSNESS
WETHER IN THE FORM of vigilantism, feuds, riots,
gangsterism, simple felony, or war, nineteenth-century
Kentucky in many ways specialized in lawlessness and
disorder. The Civil War disrupted many county govern-
ments and heightened an already festering crime
problem. Reconstruction further intensified lawlessness
and pitted many counties against the federal government
when it attempted to encroach upon their control over
local affairs.
Throughout the Civil War, Kentucky's commitment to
the Union cause was at best tentative. Families, friends,
churches, and political parties divided over the issue. In
many respects, the county symbolized the common-
wealth's dilemma and led her drift to organized chaos.
Sheriffs in some counties collected taxes and turned them
over to the pro-Confederate Provisional Government. In
other counties sheriffs were intimidated by rebel guer-
rillas and found it impossible to collect taxes, enforce
judgments, or carry out the simplest of responsibilities.
Most sheriffs found it necessary at least to obtain special
legislation permitting a certain leeway in the execution of
official business. Not surprisingly, many sheriffs and
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other county officers resigned their offices in the face of
torn loyalties and paramilitary harassment.
Within counties, officers sometimes came into conflict
with one another in attempts to control county govern-
ment. Early in the war, justices of the peace prevented
the county judge of Wolfe County from holding court
because he was suspected of Southern sympathies. In
1862, a loyal justice held court, purported to fire the
sheriff and all others of rebel taint, and attempted to
govern the county. Many doubted the legality of his
actions, however, and the county languished for several
months in a state of semianarchy.
War also disrupted county elections. In some counties
disloyal sheriffs refused to hold elections, and private
citizens had to assume control of the ballot box. In others
federal troops intimidated voters, keeping all but the
steadfast Union supporters from the polls. In some cases
the legislature invalidated the results of coerced elec-
tions, but in most, Unionists won without challenge.
Peace did not end the turmoil in Kentucky, but in
contrast to their performance in wartime, counties dis-
played rare unity with regard to federal policy. Because of
the presence of large numbers of newly emancipated
blacks, Congress voted to extend the jurisdiction of the
Freedmen's Bureau to Kentucky. Designed to assist
former slaves in their adjustment to freedom, the bureau
soon encountered stiff opposition from county govern-
ments whose jurisdiction it most directly challenged. The
bureau primarily oversaw the apprenticing and care of
black orphans, indigents, and vagrants-traditional areas
of concern for county courts. Undermanned, poorly
budgeted, and highly unpopular, the bureau depended
for its success on cooperation with the county courts.
The counties soon made it clear that such cooperation
would not be forthcoming. Emboldened by a recently
passed statute giving preference to former owners in the
apprenticing of black children, the county courts bound
out young blacks to their ex-masters in wholesale fashion.
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Often they did this without consulting parents or nearest
relatives of the children, in direct violation of the law. In
many counties, judges bound out children to former
masters who then hired them out to third parties in
blatant violation of the provisions of their indentures. By
mid-1867 it was apparent to most bureau officials that the
county courts were perpetuating a kind of slavery in the
guise of indentures ofapprenticeship. One judge went so
far as to declare the Freedmen's Bureau Act inapplicable
to Kentucky, even though the statutory language clearly
indicated otherwise.
Bureau officials intervened in some county court ap-
prenticeship proceedings and occasionally succeeded in
overturning illegal indentures and protecting the rights
of blacks. But such cases amounted to a small fraction of
the total. Efforts by the bureau to deal informally with
county judges and other county officials likewise usually
proved unavailing. So too did direct dealings with white
masters of apprentices.
Their efforts at negotiation and compromise having
failed, the bureau turned for advice to James Speed, a
prominent Louisville attorney and former United States
attorney general. After studying the state statute and
county court practice, Speed advised the bureau to seek
relief in the federal courts. While the federal courts
inevitably overturned county court indentures issued in
violation of the rights of freedmen, few petitions ever
reached those tribunals. In short, the counties largely
succeeded in frustrating the efforts of the bureau to ease
the plight of black apprentices; simultaneously they
created their own special brand of servitude.
The bureau enjoyed a little more success in its dealings
with counties on the question of caring for indigent
blacks. Shortly after the war's end, the legislature passed
a special poll tax on blacks to fund their poor relief.
Bureau officials complained that many counties failed to
spend the tax for its intended purpose. These counties
simply underwrote former slaveowners who wished to
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retain their slaves but could not afford to feed and house
them. Despite bureau charges, the evidence suggests that
some counties made at least partial efforts to provide poor
blacks with minimal funds. But many others carried out
the law in ways benefiting whites, paying scant attention
to the needs of blacks.
County officials likewise utilized their jurisdiction
over vagrants to continue slavery in Kentucky after the
Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified. Empowered to
arrest suspected vagrants and turn them over to circuit
courts for trial, county officials eagerly snatched up suspi-
cious-looking blacks by the droves. Circuit courts, too,
proved especially willing to convict blacks of vagrancy
and sell them into involuntary servitude for extended
periods of time, the traditional nineteenth-century pen-
alty for such offenders regardless of skin color.
The place of the counties in Kentucky's so-called Re-
construction clearly revealed their immense power in the
nineteenth-century commonwealth. Not even the federal
government could force them to give up traditional areas
of local control. And, at the same time, the counties led
white Kentucky's successful fight to preserve the an-
tebellum social order.
Counties controlled crime far less successfully. Twen-
tieth-century crime pales in comparison with the nine-
teenth-century criminal assault on the daily lives of Ken-
tuckians (and Americans in general). In many ways the
counties lay at the root of the problem. County officials
remained the central figures of law enforcement
throughout the century. Their general failure to carry out
their responsibilities, and in some cases their willing
participation in criminal acts, accounted in large part for
the great crime wave of the period.
The presence of at least nine separate vigilante move-
ments in Kentucky before 1850 attests to the prevalence
of crime during the antebellum period. Usually not para-
military in method or motivation, prewar criminals
seldom committed felonies in the name of honor or patri-
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otism; they simply robbed, maimed, and murdered for
personal profit or vengeance. During and after the Civil
War, the pure criminal was still abroad, but he was often
joined in the field ofpillage by brigands with a false sense
of honor based on family, race, nation, or geographic
section. Vigilantism, itselfa form oflawlessness designed
to stem lawlessness, naturally continued to flourish in
such an atmosphere.
The Ku Klux Klan was the most spectacular form of
paramilitary organization operating in the cause of mis-
placed patriotism. Derived from a variety ofpro-Southern
guerrilla movements of the war, the Klan flourished
throughout the Reconstruction period in Kentucky. Even
without a system of centralized control, local Klans at-
tained much more power in Kentucky than in any other
state outside the former Confederacy. Although the Dem-
ocratic party always denied involvement and prominent
party members and newspapers condelnned the move-
ment, the Klan devoted part of its activities to disrupting
Republican meetings (especially if blacks were present)
and intimidating would-be Republican voters (especially
if they were black). The organization (or, more appro-
priately, organizations) also made it a practice to terrorize
blacks generally, whether they were acting politically or
not. In short, it was the special mission of the Klan to
preserve the white man's Kentucky for the white man.
But the Klan's criminal activities also sometimes took a
more traditional form. Often a local Klan organization
abandoned its patriotic cover and performed blatant acts
of robbery, mayhem, and murder in order to line the
pockets of its members orto gratify some bizarre notion of
personal honor not associated with race or state. (Guer-
rilla bands had operated in much the same way during the
war.)
By the very nature of their activity, Klans presented
county officials with a problem of law enforcement-at
least in theory. Since governors (all Democrats) refused
to order the state guard to put down the Klan because in
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their opinion the problem was either local or nonexistent,
it was up to county officials as the traditional officers of
law enforcement to put the Klan out of business. No such
result ever occurred. Those county officers who became
actively involved with the Klan did so as members, not as
antagonists. Disinterest rather than law enforcement
stopped the Klan, if it was ever stopped.
By the late 1870s the Klan began to decline as an
instrument of terror, but another sinister social institution
soon took its place-the feud. Also in many ways born of
the war and nurtured by its lingering antagonisms, feuds
gripped many counties between 1875 and 1895, plunging
some into conditions of anarchy. Not only did county
officials fail to suppress these antisocial manifestations,
but they often contributed to them. The counties as
political institutions so entangled themselves in the post-
war feuds that some Kentuckians advocated abolishing a
few of them as a method of suppressing the violence.
Nowhere is the connection between county politics
and feuds better illustrated than in the Rowan County
turmoil of 1884-1887. In the summer of 1884, Repub-
licans and Democrats engaged in a particularly intense
campaign over the sheriffalty, resulting in the narrow
victory of the Republican, Cook Humphrey. During an
election night fight in a Morehead tavern, Floyd Tolliver,
a prominent Democrat, wounded John Martin, an influ-
ential Republican, and another Democrat, Solomon
Bradley, was killed. After several months of threat and
counterthreat, Martin killed Tolliver, thereby provoking
the wrath of the county's most powerful family. After
arresting Martin for murder, Sheriff Humphrey placed
his fellow Republican in the Montgomery County jail in
order to protect him from the vengeance of the Tollivers.
Not to be outmaneuvered, the Tollivers forged a court
order for Martin's release to the Rowan County jail and
spirited him onto a train bound for Morehead despite his
protestations that he was about to be the victim of a
frame-up. Martin's predictions came true; a gang of Tol-
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liver sympathizers intercepted the train, dragged Martin
from it, and murdered him.
Martin's murder sparked a two-and-one-half-year
period of bloody conflicts involving families, political
parties, and county officials. Early in 1885, the Martin
gang ambushed and wounded Taylor Young, son ofDem-
ocratic County Attorney Zachary Young. Retribution
quickly followed as the Tollivers publicly vowed to drive
Republican SheriffHumphrey and his deputies out ofthe
county or bury them within because they had allegedly
conspired with John Martin to kill Floyd Tolliver and
bushwacked Taylor Young. In April the two sides waged
a pitched battle on the streets of Morehead forcing
Humphrey into hiding and almost all of the other county
officers into temporary retirement. In midsummer, the
Tollivers located Humphrey in the house of John
Martin's mother. They flushed out Humphrey (who
somehow m,anaged to escape, stopping only after he
reached Kansas), killed two of his deputies, and ap-
prehended two of the Martin daughters on fraudulent
charges.
Maintaining the initiative, the Tollivers next trumped
up charges that the absent Humphrey and his deputies
had conspired to assassinate County Attorney Young;
planning to use these charges as their own defense, they
surrendered themselves for a preliminary hearing on the
murder ofRumphrey's deputies. In order to ensure them-
selves a partisan hearing, they forced the Republican
county judge to disqualify himself, clearing the way for a
friendly Democratic justice of the peace to sit with a
Republican colleague as the examining court. In an un-
convincing show of nonpartisanship, County Attorney
Young withdrew from the case. (This was hardly the
heroic act that he himself professed, since he had been
the subject of the alleged Humphrey assassination con-
spiracy and remained an active participant in the raging
feud.) Young and the rest of the Tolliver gang dropped
any pretense of judicial restraint when Governor J.
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Proctor Knott, growing increasingly disgusted with
Rowan County's antics, sent in the attorney general as
special prosecutor. Although the attorney general ex-
posed the Humphrey conspiracy as a fabrication and the
Tollivers offered no other plausible defense for their
murderous actions, the Democratic justice of the peace
voted to discharge them, thereby allowing the defendants
to go free. To compound the travesty, the Tollivers next
arranged for a packed grand jury to indict the elder Mrs.
Martin for poisoning a turkey.
In the following year the Tollivers pursued their reign
of terror with the same relish as before. In August they
secured complete control of the county government by
winning every one of the offices except that of county
judge, which was appropriately filled by a cowardly Re-
publican who could barely read and write. Completing
the official tyranny, Craig Tolliver, head of the gang,
secured election as police judge of Morehead in early
1887. In June of that year, the Tollivers turned once more
to fraud and violence. They imprisioned a former ally, a
certain Dr. Logan, for allegedly conspiring to assassinate
County Attorney Young (the eternal victim) and then shot
Logan's two sons in the back after promising them safe
conduct to the county jail.
This latest outrage proved the undoing of the Tollivers.
The surviving son, Boone Logan, after vainly appealing
to Governor Knott for military intervention by the state
guard, organized a vigilante group which on June 22,
1887, surprised the Tollivers, killing Craig Tolliver and
several of his most powerful associates in the battle that
ensued. The Tollivers continued their resistance,
sending to another county for reinforcements. Faced with
this new threat to civil order, Governor Knott at last sent
in state troops. Although the military kept the peace, it
could not prevent the county and commonwealth at-
torneys from conspiring with a packed grand jury to indict
several of the regulators for murder. Fortunately for the
vigilantes, the petit jury acquitted the defendants of all
44
charges. So outrageous had the feud become in the
public's eye that the normally conservative General As-
sembly only narrowly defeated a bill to abolish the rebel-
lious county.
Other feuds stemmed from overzealous county poli-
ticking. The election for county judge in Breathitt County
in 1878 revived antagonisms originating in the Civil War.
Shortly after the election, County Judge J. W. Burnett led
one of the factions in a pitched battle against the other in
the streets of Jackson, the county seat. On the following
day unknown persons ambushed and killed Burnett as he
and his "gang of toughs" led a captured opponent to jail.
Burnett's death only caused his survivors to fight the
harder, with the sheriff leading the attack "as a partisan."
Other county officers took leaves of absence or resigned.
None of the justices of the peace would stand in for
Burnett, and the circuit judge refused to hold court.
Reluctantly, Governor James B. McCreary sent in state
troops to restore order, however temporarily. Subsequent
battles would prompt observers to refer to the county as
"Bloody Breathitt."
Although it began because of the machinations of a
disloyal business associate, Perry County's feud of 1887-
1889 soon became entangled in county politics. Most
county officials allied with the Eversole family, one ofthe
principals in the fracas. Joe Eversole's father-in-law had
been county judge .and after August 1888 Eversole's
brother took over the office. Neither would issue arrest
warrants against members of the family. Sheriff James L.
Howard displayed similar tendencies, refusing to arrest
two notorious desperadoes because they were his
"friends." Those relatives or friends of the family who
somehow found themselves in jail usually escaped with
the assistance offriendly SheriffHoward. The grand jury,
also heavily stacked with Eversoles, refused to return
indictments. The Eversoles' sworn enemies, the French
family and their friends, finding themselves largely
locked out of county government, in self-defense hired a
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special "posse" of Breathitt County hoodlums. Once
more the governor sent in troops, but as soon as they left,
fighting resumed and the feud simmered throughout the
remainder of the century.
Politics, family pride, racial tension, and ultimately a
falling out among relatives contributed to the Garrard
County feuds of 1874-1877. The maintenance of power
within the county government was the overriding con-
cern of the combatants. The Kennedy family remained at
the center of the storm throughout its duration, the most
prominent members being Ebbert (known to most as
"Uncle Eb") and his nephew, Grove. Ebbert was the
leader of the family and county boss of the Democratic
party. He had held various offices of county government,
including those of justice of the peace, surveyor, and
county court clerk. As circuit court clerk and master
commissioner in 1874, he administered many of the es-
tates of the county, since most of the residents died
without leaving wills. Eb's political prowess, his control
over significant amounts of property, his powerful posi-
tion in local government, and his leadership ofa large and
closely knit family made him the most influential citizen
of the county. His most trusted and effective ally was his
nephew, Grove, whose quick draw, violent temper, and
hard drinking made him a fearsome creature to most of
his neighbors.
In 1874, Uncle Eb sought reelection as circuit court
clerk. The recent enfranchisement of blacks had so
strengthened the Republican party that Eb labeled him-
self an "independent Democrat" in an effort to win sup-
port from uncommitted voters. Despite his attempts at
nonpartisanship and his intense campaigning, Eb faced
strong opposition from J. K. Faulkner, an ally of William
Sellers, the most influential Republican in the county.
Several weeks before election day, Eb grew desperate
and made a deal with Sellers. Eb promised to throw some
Democratic support to the Republican candidate for
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county clerk if Sellers would undercut Faulkner in the
circuit court clerk's race. Despite assurances of Sellers's
support, Eb lost the election and quickly concluded that
he had been doublecrossed. Refusing to give up without a
fight, Eb contested the election results and kept his office
in the interim. Not content with these official procedures,
he openly denounced Sellers, accusing him of a wide
variety of cowardly acts.
Such verbal abuse eventually brought Eb to a confron-
tation with Sellers on the streets of Lancaster. As Sellers
was about to discharge his pistol into Eb's face, Grove
Kennedy, standing in a window above, ordered his with-
drawal. Fearing a full-blown feud, certain citizens of the
county telegraphed the commander of federal troops in
Louisville to send a peace-keeping detachment to Lan-
caster. Exhibiting their contempt for such outside inter-
ference, Eb and a henchman, on the day. following the
arrival of the troops, stood in front of the courthouse and
baited a group ofpro-Sellers blacks with racial slurs. Soon
afterwards the blacks appeared with late-model rifles. In
the gun fight that followed, a member ofthe Kennedy clan
was killed and the blacks were sent scurrying to Sellers's
home, which they converted into an armed fortress. The
next day the Sellers group wounded Squire Yeaky, a
Kennedy ally, and attacked Eb Kennedy's home,
wounding one of his grandchildren.
Securing numerous reinforcements, Eb and Grove
Kennedy led an attack on Sellers's home, sending Sellers
into exile from the county and his black allies into the
public square where they finally surrendered after state
troops arrived to reinforce the federal detachment. His
political enemies either in surrender or hiding out, Uncle
Eb once more seized the reins of county political power
and began anew to administer intestate estates.
Ironically, Eb's final feud was with nephew Grove,
who disputed his uncle's administration of his wife's
estate. Unable to settle their differences judicially, Grove
shot Eb dead in the courthouse in full view of the hor-
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rified local circuit judge. After being apprehended and
then escaping, Grove eventually surrendered himself for
trial. He was released after a jury was unable to agree on
a verdict.
Rival families and their battles over county office also
accounted for the Clay County feud of 1898-1901. Since
before the Civil War members of the White and Garrard
families feuded over politics and more trivial matters,
such as hound dogs. In 1898, their fury attained new
heights in a struggle over the sheriffalty. Whichever clan
controlled this office often escaped apprehension and
prosecution for crimes committed against the other. After
a fierce struggle, the Whites (Democrats) retained control
of the office despite the efforts of the Garrards (Repub-
licans) to attract the support of dissident Democrats.
Following the election, the clans squabbled over timber
rights on adjoining properties and ultimately vented their
frustrations in a series of murderous ambushes. State
troops momentarily stilled the argument and lleld three
of the offending Garrard clan for trial. Passions were
renewed when the Whites assassinated one of the three
as he stood near the opening of his militia tent. Governor
W. O. Bradley conducted special meetings on the
problem to no avail, and it took the patient negotiations of
a courageous circuit court judge three years later to end
the raging feud. The disputants signed a formal peace
treaty on March 13, 1901.
There can be no doubt but that the county figured
prominently in the feuds of nineteenth-century Ken-
tucky. Not only county politics and negligent county
peace officers, but the large number of counties contrib-
uted to the local wars. "These little county organisms are
storm centers from which feuds are created . . . from
which antagonisms radiate," argued a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention of 1890-1891. As he saw it,
many feuds began over the spoils of county office and
perpetuated themselves anlidst the natural hostilities of
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closely knit communities. Elaborating upon this theme,
the Courier-Journal charged that a "county brawl" inevi-
tably involved large segments ofa typically small county,
and thus it was impossible to find impartial peace officers
or juries. In addition, the smallness of most counties
contributed to tensions. In a population closeted together
within confined geographical boundaries, familiar with
one another's weaknesses and ambitions, competing
against one another for political and economic leverage, it
was almost certain that normal tensions would produce
abnormal reactions. These conditions, united with
gnawing poverty, illiteracy, lack of such stable institu-
tions as churches, and lingering frustrations from the war,
produced Kentucky's feuds and high crime rate.
Feuds, of course, were only the most sensational form
of lawlessness. Ordinary crime also mushroomed in the
second half of the century, drawing loud complaints from
politicians and citizens alike that peace officers stood by
while thugs robbed, maimed, and murdered. The New
York Times reported that Kentucky trailed the nation in
law enforcement. Governors constantly carped at county
officials for failing to enforce the laws. Yet the problem
was not simply one of electing more resolute men. De-
spite the presence of large numbers of cowardly or crim-
inal county officers, other conditions contributed to the
crime wave.
The most important officer in the state's corps of law
enforcers, the sheriff, found himself burdened with so
many other tasks that he often had little time to ap-
prehend criminals. Tax collecting alone took an inordi-
nate amount of time. Also the fees the sheriff received for
his civil responsibilities far exceeded any he could col-
lect from crime-fighting efforts. Nor did the sheriff pos-
sess adequate instruments with which to cope with much
of the state's crime. Even his critics admitted that the
posse comitatus, composed ofthose volunteers whom the
sheriff could persuade to lend a hand at a moment's
notice, afforded little relief against organized bands of
49
criminals. By the time the sheriff had convinced enough
civilians that they should risk their lives to protect the
community, the outlaws had usually secured themselves
in hiding.
Even those few sheriffs who took their law enforce-
ment duties seriously sometimes found themselves in the
thick of feuds and other outrages. A typical example was
Walter Saunders, who retired in 1876 after a highly suc-
cessful career as sheriff of Lincoln County. Within the
county, Saunders performed effectively and honestly,
apprehending all types of criminals from corn rustlers to
such highwaymen as the notorious Jim Bridgewater. But
outside the county, he descended to the level of a
common criminal (for example, he joined Eb Kennedy in
his gun battle with William Sellers for control of Garrard
County). After his retirement from the sheriffalty,
Saunders became embroiled in a feud with Jim Berth-
uram, whose brother he had killed while arresting a gang
of thieves. In early 1878, Saunders made a citizen's arrest
of another of Berthuram's brothers and two friends who
were accused of robbing and torturing an elderly couple
and participating in a general wave of crime encom-
passing Lincoln, Rockcastle, and Garrard counties. After
driving Jim Berthuram into hiding, Saunders took his
three captives to the Rockcastle County jail. Not content
with this bit of heroics, he subsequently led a party of
nearly a hundred men to the jail, dragged the trio to a
nearby tree, and promptly lynched them. Appropriately,
Saunders met his end in the same year, when he unsuc-
cessfully stormed Richmond in an effort to avenge his
brother who had been beaten by the town marshal. To
complete the paradox, his widow discovered herselfpen-
niless-her husband had exhausted the family estate
bailing out debtors against whom he had executed judg-
ments while serving as sheriff.
Governors commanded the most effective weapon
against collective lawlessness-the state guard. But it
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was impossible to send troops to every county where
crime raged uncontested, and after the soldiers left, crim-
inal activities usually were as prevalent as ever. More-
over, governors tended to resist calls for troops; crime
fighting was essentially a local problem, they said, and
use of the state guard was too expensive a measure.
Governors contributed to crime not only through inac-
tion, but through the too liberal use of their pardoning
power. According to the New York Times, which kept a
fascinated watch on Kentucky throughout the second half
of the century, the "reckless exercise of the pardoning
power by the Governor has been a direct incitement to
crime." But one of those most often accused of leniency,
Governor Luke P. Blackburn, contended that he granted
pardons only because of his humanitarian instincts. Ap-
palled by conditions at the state penitentiary where pris-
oners were stuffed into four-by-six-foot cells and died at
"a fearful rate," Blackburn believed it his duty to free as
many as possible. Blackburn also contended that many of
the prisoners had committed only trivial crimes and had
been charged by prosecuting attorneys eager to bolster
their incomes through fees earned by trying cases.
And it was true that prosecutors contributed to the
crime problem by obtaining convictions of petty crimi-
nals while failing in their efforts against major ones. Often
either young and inexperienced or old and incompetent,
county and commonwealth attorneys usually found them-
selves completely overshadowed by defense counsel. So
scandalous was the situation that wealthy families with
criminal victims normally hired private counsel to assist
in the prosecution of the offender.
Judges, juries and legislators likewise added to the
burden. Judges often failed to keep their dockets current,
refused to try cases in feud-torn counties, and displayed
undue leniency toward hardened criminals. Frequently
composed of deadbeats who hung around courthouses
hoping to earn a quick fee, juries acted no more res-
olutely. A Nicholas County murderer, sentenced by a
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jury in 1877 to only eleven years in prison, thanked the
twelve men, admitting that he believed "he deserved the
extreme penalty of the law" and expressing surprise at
the light sentence. Critics charged that legislatures were
dominated by criminal lawyers who wished to bolster
their own professional advantage by composing a lax
criminal code.
County officials as well as criminals profited from
crime, since the state was required by statute to pay most
of the cost of enforcing the criminal law. Annual outlays
for this purpose steadily increased throughout the cen-
tury so that by 1870 a sizable portion of the state budget
went to crime fighting. Unscrupulous county peace of-
ficers added to the expense by setting up collusive crimes
and fraudulent claims. It was not unusual for a sheriff,
jailer, or constable to arrange a friendly fight between two
cronies, one of whom would be slightly wounded. After
the other "escaped" to an appointed spot in another
county, the peace officers would give chase, apprehend
the "criminal," and transport him back to the local jail.
For this and for escorting him to circuit court (where he
would be acquitted), the officers would receive fees from
the commonwealth.
Complain though they might, Kentuckians did little in
the nineteenth century to cure the problem of increasing
crime and inadequate law enforcement. Citizens con-
stantly petitioned the legislature for remedial action, but
largely to no avail. Some turned to protest meetings;
others resorted to vigilantism, and while this form of
regulation produced temporary benefits in some
counties, it normally became itself a sinister type of
lawlessness. The best solution, never in the nineteenth
century advanced beyond the planning stage, was the
creation of a professional, specialized county police
force.
Urban counties entertained the notion of county police
departments during the last three decades of the nine-
teenth century. Jefferson County secured various laws
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from the General Assembly permitting the appointment
of policemen, but only took advantage of the option for
special events such as county fairs and horse races (and
then at the expense of the proprietors requesting the
protection). In 1876 a group of Fayette County residents
petitioned the county court for the creation of a "county
detective force" to render their "houses and prop-
erty . . . more secure than they have been for a number
of years." Even though the petitioners would have ac-
cepted a tax increase, believing that a reduction in crime
would result in a net saving, the court refused to establish
a detective force, expressing fears that it would evolve
into a "secret police." County residents, citing the ease
with which burglars robbed their houses, persisted in
their demands for more adequate police protection, and
in 1878 the legislature passed a statute permitting the
county judge to appoint a constabulary of up to five men.
Once more the court refused to act. Eight years later the
legislature passed a broader law authorizing the counties
of Fayette, Kenton, and Campbell to create police dis-
tricts for designated suburban areas if taxpayers owning a
majority of the assessed land so petitioned their county
courts. Apparently more concerned with their tax rates
than their security, taxpayers did not petition the courts in
sufficient numbers, and no police departments were es-
tablished. Kentuckians responded to crime as they did to
bad roads; they constantly complained, but were un-
willing to pay for solutions.
5LITTLE ENGINES
OF IMPROVEMENT
IN AN AGE WHEN travel was difficult and sometimes im-
possible, it is not surprising that a major preoccupation of
nineteenth-century Kentuckians was finding ways to im-
prove transportation. Counties played an increasingly
instrumental part in the search for and development of
these schemes, whether involving paths and dirt roads or
ferries, over which counties had specific jurisdiction, or
turnpikes and railroads, over which they exercised in-
creasing financial influence.
Dirt roads and macadamized turnpikes were Ken-
tucky's primary avenues oftransportation until after 1850,
when railroads took on increasing importance. Most road-
building projects were joint ventures, combining the
resources ofgovernment with those ofprivate enterprise.
Turnpike companies built many of the major roads. Spe-
cially chartered by the legislature, they derived most of
their capital from state and local government, the
counties being the most important local source. Turn-
pikes offered the advantage of macadamized surfaces,
which withstood the pressures of time and travel more
readily than dirt roads. Unfortunately for the traveler,
most of the roads constructed in the nineteenth century
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were of the latter type, the majority of them simply two
dirt ruts. For many months of the year, rain and snow
converted the ruts into muddy canals, rendering them
impassable. Heavy rains washed some roads away, neces-
sitating the building of new ones when dry weather
finally appeared.
Counties maintained most of the free roads and some of
the turnpikes, if the companies that had built them no
longer had the funds to service them. Throughout the
nineteenth century the labor tax remained the principal
method by which counties furnished manpower to repair
roads. Originally every able-bodied man in the county
owed as many days' work on the local road as the road
overseer directed, although eventually the legislature
limited each man's workload to a specific number ofdays.
The county court appointed road overseers or surveyors
to supervise the labor; usually there were at least fifty of
these officials in each county. Wealthier landowners nor-
mally hired substitutes rather than work roads them-
selves, and later in the century they simply paid a certain
sum in lieu of work. But the average farmer could not
afford to pay proxies and was subject to "road calls" at any
moment.
Needless to say, the labor tax was not a popular institu-
tion in nineteenth-century Kentucky. During harvest the
road calls brought forth especially loud cries of protest,
although the service was never at any time gladly given.
In the early part of the century, whites so complained at
having to work alongside blacks that the General As-
sembly prohibited slaveowners from sending slaves in
their stead. Conscientious road overseers earned only
scorn from their neighbors, who bitterly resented having
to leave their fields to fill in chuckholes and rebuild roads.
It was not uncommon for farmers to flee their houses and
hide in the nearest woods rather than be served work
summonses. In such an atmosphere it was perhaps inevi-
table that most overseers worked the roads only those few
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days necessary to avoid prosecution. Consequently most
roads remained primitive paths, suitable for passage in
only the most favorable weather.
Naturally many Kentuckians despaired over the gener-
ally deplorable condition oftheir roads and the system by
which most were maintained, and some advocated spe-
cific reforms. In 1830 at the prompting of Robert Wick-
liffe, Sr., himself a state senator and one of the wealthiest
men in Fayette County, the legislature enacted statutes
permitting counties to alter the old road system. If it
accepted the change, a county would substitute for the
labor tax a per capita money tax, which would be used to
pay road commissioners and laborers. Most counties that
considered reform put the question to the voters, but only
a few ever secured majorities for the adoption of the new
system. Some of these subsequently repealed the new
ordinances, apparently finding money taxes even more
unpleasant than road labor.
While agreeing to an optional reform for the rest of the
counties, Wickliffe insisted upon a mandatory revision
for Fayette. Salaried commissioners and paid laborers
would replace overseers and self-help, and the results
would be, in Wickliffe's opinion, revolutionary. Fayette
County would soon be blessed with the best roads in the
commonwealth, her economy would soar to even greater
heights of prosperity, and the general public would no
longer be saddled with the onerous labor tax. But Wick-
liffe's prognostications proved overoptimistic. The
county court, unhappy at having to relinquish part of its
jurisdiction to a new group of public officials, succeeded
in delaying implementation of the road law. When finally
the court authorized the election of road commissioners,
most voters staged their own protest by refusing to vote
for any of the candidates for the new positions. A few did
vote, but those commissioners who were theoretically
"elected" came to the next session ofthe county court and
resigned their positions. A disappointed Wickliffe se-
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cured repeal of the reform legislation at the next session
of the General Assembly.
Even turnpikes failed to afford their chief promotors
the success they had confidently forecast. The economy
of counties in which the macadamized roads were built
hardly ever attained the levels predicted by turnpike
builders, and the roads themselves often deteriorated
because of inadequate maintenance. By the end of the
Civil War it was evident to many that in some counties
turnpikes were actually impediments to economic
growth. Critics in Fayette and surrounding counties com-
plained that high tolls kept farmers away from Lexington.
These observers also noted that many tollkeepers be-
haved rudely to customers, allowed friends and relatives
to pass without charge, and failed to guarantee the safe
and secure passage of clients. Sagging revenues contrib-
uted to the growing disillusionment of investors. By 1880,
serious movements to convert turnpikes to free roads
under the supervision of the counties themselves had
commenced in many places. In 1890 Fayette County
became one of the first to endorse this reform, and many
other counties followed suit in the next decade. Such
change did not occur without great controversy and some
bloodshed, however, as witness the turnpike riots
throughout Kentucky in the 1890s and early twentieth
century.
Counties exerted influence over other forms of trans-
portation in nineteenth-century Kentucky. During the
antebellum period, especially, their ability to grant fran-
chises to ferry operators and to regulate their rates proved
very significant in an age of relatively few bridges. Ferry
operators along the Ohio River had especially lucrative
enterprises, and applicants often waged spirited battles
for the exclusive right to operate a franchise in a particular
area. The prominent Taylor family of Campbell County
contested the city of Newport's ferry rights for more than
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twenty years. Maysville successfully resisted the efforts
of four of her private citizens to compete with her ferry
service to Ohio, and Covington likewise prevailed
against a would-be private competitor.
In 1830, Kentuckians began their love-hate affair with
the railroad, the magnificent innovation that was sup-
posed to bring them so much happiness but often brought
only grief. From 1830 to 1850, railroad promoters in the
commonwealth were noted more for false starts than for
successes. And in the process of their failures, railroad
men sometimes raided county treasuries. Fayette
County's abortive relationship with the Louisville, Cin-
cinnati, and Charleston Railroad from 1836 to 1840 illus-
trates some of the frustrations attending early county in-
vestment.
Striving to connect the Ohio Valley with the Carolina
coast, backers of the Louisville, Cincinnati, and
Charleston Railroad predicted that the construction of
their line would bring new markets and wealth to central
Kentucky. Business and government leaders of Fayette
County were anxious to revitalize the county's economy
(which had been losing ground to Jefferson County's
since the introduction of the steamboat), and for this
reason they urged the governments of the county and
Lexington to purchase large chunks of the company's
stock on the condition that the line would terminate at
Lexington rather than at Louisville. Representatives of
the railroad willingly secured an amendment to the com-
pany's charter providing that Lexington would be the
railroad's Kentucky terminus and further promised that
construction would begin there. In December 1836 the
Fayette County Court voted to subscribe to $100,000
worth of railroad stock to be financed by a special ad
valorem tax on real property.
Many in the county expressed little joy about the pro-
posed stock subscription. By late March 1837 the Ken-
tucky Gazette, itself a promoter of the venture, reported
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that many residents of the county opposed the invest-
ment. Soon thereafter, organized opposition to the sub-
scription manifested itself in the form ofmeetings held in
various parts of the county. Dissidents who opposed the
railroad venture demanded that the county court hold a
special election on the subscription and be bound by its
results. The railroad supporters made valiant efforts to
rally support, holding meetings of their own and bom-
barding the newspapers with letters, but the county court
deemed unrest overthe investment to be so profound that
it reluctantly ordered a referendum on the question.
The announcement of a special election touched off an
extended debate on the legality of the subscription and
the merits of the railroad. Detractors said that it was
unconstitutional for a county to invest in a private railroad
and further predicted collapse ofthe venture. Proponents
argued that the future welfare of the county's economy
depended on rail routes to the East Coast and denounced
opponents for trying to achieve tax savings at the expense
of progress. In August, the voters of Fayette County
approved the subscription by a margin of more than two
to one, with county residents barely endorsing the mea-
sure in contrast to Lexington's overwhelming support.
The election victory proved to be the high point for the
railroad and its supporters. Pledges of support were not
forthcoming from other public sectors, and private in-
vestors could not take up the slack. By spring of 1838 the
picture appeared so bleak that some in Fayette County
advocated forfeiture of the subscription. Eschewing such
drastic action, the county court voted to postpone collec-
tion of the annual installment until the railroad could
furnish better proof of its solvency and intention to com-
mence construction within the near future. The dreary
condition of the company made such declarations im-
possible, and in November citizens of the county held a
public meeting to anguish over their apparent loss. By
spring of the following year the county court groped for
ways to recoup its losses and voted to place surplus
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railroad funds in a special account for improvement of the
county clerk's office. During the next three years the
court made unsuccessful attempts to recover all or part of
the $10,000 it had paid to the company, which had ceased
operations in Kentucky without ever laying a single sec-
tion of track in the commonwealth.
If Fayette County learned anything from its unhappy
experience with the Louisville, Cincinnati, and
Charleston Railroad, it was only a very temporary lesson.
By 1851, it began to join other counties in considering
investments in new railroad ventures. Such considera-
tions marked the beginning of more than forty years of
intimate county involvement with railroad schemes. At
the same time the state government, which had invested
more than $5,.000,000 in turnpikes between 1812 and
1850, virtually bowed out of the transportation business
for the rest of the century. Private funds continued to be
scarce, and although towns and cities also invested
heavily, counties were the major source of railroad capital
in Kentucky during the last half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Unfortunately, for the counties, while this distinc-
tion once more highlighted their significance in the lives
of nineteenth-century Kentuckians, it did not signal a
departure from their record of poor financial planning.
Counties seldom derived any profit from their railroad
investments and often lost everything.
Before promoters of railroad ventures within county
governments could begin their binge of investment, they
first had to surmount certain constitutional objections to
government assistance to private business. In 1851, more
than 150 taxpayers ofMason County sought to prevent the
county court from investing heavily in the Maysville and
Lexington Railroad Company on the grounds that such
involvement violated the state constitution. Despite ex-
tended arguments of counsel to the contrary and a
lengthy, well-reasoned dissenting opinion by one justice,
a majority on the Court ofAppeals sustained the county's
investment, thereby scotching for forty years serious
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legal arguments over the question. From that time on,
critics of government aid to railroads in Kentucky
stressed economic rather than constitutional problems.
Having surmounted the most serious legal challenge to
their ventures, railroad promoters were free to unleash
their highly organized and alluring campaigns to entice
counties into subscribing huge amounts to their ventures.
Such promotions often resembled carnivals and included
flamboyant speeches, personal endorsements by political
and military heroes, mass meetings evincing almost hys-
terical support, and predictions of perpetual prosperity.
Woe to the county, the railroad men inevitably cautioned,
that failed to join the national rush to railroads. Grass
would soon grow in the streets of the county seat, farm-
land would decline in value, and commercial relations
with other counties and states would deteriorate if the
county refused to invest. The entrepreneurs who were
puffing railroads invariably pointed to the supposed
progress of neighboring counties as further inducement
for participation. Counties with railroads would surely
outdistance those without them.
Such oratory contributed to conflicts between counties
over the location of proposed railroads and encouraged
outside intervention in subscription battles. As Fayette
County and Lexington continued the battle to regain
their former position in the commonwealth's economy,
Jefferson County and Louisville sought to undermine
efforts to make Lexington a railroad hub. In 1851, Lex-
ington newspapers reported that Louisvillians were en-
couraging "disaffected persons" in Boyle County to op-
pose a possible railroad route to Lexington in favor ofone
to Frankfort. Three years later Louisville sought ways to
discourage the construction of the proposed Nashville
and Cincinnati Railroad for fear that Lexington would
become the southern focal point ofa vast northern system
of railroads. After the Civil War, the Louisville and Nash-
ville Railroad, with headquarters in the county seat of
Jefferson County and by far the most successful railroad
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of the commonwealth, strove to maintain its supremacy
by stalling legislative approval of the Cincinnati
Southern, which threatened to benefit Fayette County,
and worked to frustrate other ventures which might work
to the advantage of central Kentucky counties. In 1885, L
& N agents are said to have appeared in Harrodsburg with
plenty of "boodle" in order to scotch Mercer County's
flirtation with the rival Louisville and Southern
Railroad.
Other counties played similar games. Fayette County
reportedly helped secure the defeat of Bourbon County's
proposed subscription to the Paris and Maysville
Railroad in 1870. In 1851, Boyle countians opposed
routing of the Lexington and Danville Railroad through
Harrodsburg because this might help the Harrodsburg
economy at the expense of Danville. Almost simultane-
ously, a Franklin County delegation attempted to per-
suade Mercer County to build a railroad to Frankfort
rather than to Lexington, while in 1872, Clark countians
campaigned to have the Frankfort, Paris, and Big Sandy
Railroad built through Mount Sterling rather than
Owingsville. In 1869, Cincinnati's planned railroad
south elicited delegations from several Kentucky
counties attempting to influence the line's location, with
Lexingtonians pledging money if the route ran through
their city.
The railroad subscriptions also produced conflict be-
tween town and countryside. Although legislatures freely
authorized counties to subscribe to railroad stock, they
always required them first to secure voter approval. Cities
and towns solidly approved such ventures for the most
part, while rural residents normally opposed them. Town
dwellers did not curtail their support even in the face of
double taxation as residents of two separate local govern-
ments. Deeply resentful ofbeing bound to taxes by urban
majorities, rural residents began to demand that voters
residing outside of county seats be required to endorse
subscriptions separately before they became valid. One
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of the liveliest of the battles occurred in Bourbon County
following the Civil War. Despite numerous petitions and
personal appearances by promoters, the members of the
Bourbon County Court refused to submit to the voters the
question of a subscription to the stock of the Frankfort,
Paris, and Big Sandy Railroad. Political leaders of Paris
protested the court's intransigence, noting that the three
justices of the peace who supported submission were all
from Paris and represented more voters than the other
eleven magistrates combined. All pleas to the court
having failed, representatives from the railroad and Paris
secured an amendment to the statute creating the com-
pany's charter. Under this amendment the county was
compelled to hold an election on the subject of sub-
scription.
Rural residents resented this latest ploy and de-
nounced it as an attempt to usurp the duly constituted
authority of the county court. Railroad supporters coun-
tered with the argument that the court had unlawfully
prevented the voters from expressing themselves on the
question of the subscription. "Rubbish!" cried the oppo-
nents, who lambasted the notion that a tyrannical ma-
jority could force a minority to pay taxes for projects it
opposed. So the battle raged until election day, when
voters narrowly endorsed the venture. After all this tur-
moil, the county never spent a penny on the road, for its
backers failed to secure needed support from sur-
rounding counties and private investors, and the scheme
collapsed before Bourbon officials were to pay their first
installment.
Bourbon County was not alone in experiencing con-
troversy over a proposed railroad subscription. Virtually
all such ventures encountered some opposition, and the
predictions of dire consequences usually proved accu-
rate. Many of the promised railroads were never built,
and those that were often went through at least one
reorganization that wiped out the counties' investments.
In the spring of 1851, after much debate on the issue,
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Fayette countians voted to invest $600,000 in the stock of
three railroads. Other counties quickly followed suit, but
none realized any permanent ownership in the concerns
even though the roads were eventually built. Inaccurate
cost estimates, unexpected geographical impediments,
and lack of capital forced each road into bankruptcy,
causing all of the counties to lose their investments en-
tirely.
More protracted and equally frustrating were efforts of
certain central Kentucky counties to underwrite a
railroad connecting their region with the mineral-rich
counties of eastern Kentucky. Known by various names
and sometimes involving more than one company, the
"Big Sandy" enterprise began in the 1850s and lasted
well beyond the Civil War. Buoyed by promises of great
wealth and expanded markets, the counties of Fayette,
Greenup, Bath, Clark, and Montgomery and the city of
Lexington subscribed in 1853 to over a million dollars of
stock in the Lexington and Big Sandy Railroad Company.
Underfinanced and overmanipulated, this line died in
foreclosure shortly before the war. The dream of an
eastern connection would not die, however, and a new
Big Sandy company appeared in 1869, full of new hopes
and financial needs.
With short memories and heady aspirations, Fayette,
Montgomery, and Clark counties once more subscribed
heavily to the endeavor but other county shareholders in
the earlier venture refused to risk still more capital. By
1873 it was evident that the skeptics had been right again,
as a group of New York speculators, led by the shrewd
Collis P. Huntington, bought the Big Sandy for a small
fraction of its subscribed value. Contending that they had
been hoodwinked out of their investment, the county
shareholders took the controversy to court and to the
legislature, securing in the General Assembly a statute
requiring a majority of the Big Sandy's directors to reside
in Kentucky. Never one to run from a fight, Huntington
attempted to buy up large numbers of the certificates
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entitling taxpayers-as investors-to shares of stock. The
battle lasted until the two sides finally compromised in
1879, the counties forsaking their bid to retain substantial
control and Huntington promising to complete the line
within three years. Huntington kept his word, but as of
July 1890 the Big Sandy had paid no dividends to its
county investors.
Naturally the numerous railroad bankruptcies aroused
deep feelings of hostility within those counties that had
subscribed to the stock of the failures. This anger inten-
sified when county taxpayers realized that their govern-
ments remained liable on bonds issued to pay for railroad
stock. Believing they had been victimized by fraudulent
eastern slicksters, many counties refused to continue
paying interest on their bonds. In the face of this repudi-
ation, bondholders often took their cases to court and
inevitably secured judgments in their own favor, since
they themselves were seldom parties to fraud. Faced with
adverse judgments, counties generally assessed taxes to
pay offliabilities on their bonds but found it impossible to
collect the special levies from rebellious taxpayers. Pos-
sessed ofjudgments they could not enforce, bondholders
usually had to agree to payment at a greatly reduced
figure. Sometimes bondholder battles lasted for decades,
as illustrated by an episode in Muhlenberg County.
In 1868, Muhlenberg County subscribed to $400,000
worth of stock in the Elizabethtown and Paducah
Railroad, a venture touted by promoters as a sure way for
the county to enhance its commerce and prosperity. Al-
though it laid some track, the company did not survive
the depression of 1873 and underwent reorganization,
wiping out the county's stock interest. Because the com-
pany had neglected to deliver its stock certificates to the
county in 1868, many within the county, ignorant of the
law's technicalities, believed they had been cheated out
of their investment. In 1874, outraged residents organ-
ized an Independent Order of Taxpayers and elected a
county judge committed to repudiation. Predictably the
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judge and court of claims voted to stop paying interest on
the bonds, precipitating a twenty-five-year fight between
the county and its bondholders.
Experiencing temporary second thoughts about its de-
fiance, the Muhlenberg County Court in 1878 secured
special legislation from the General Assembly authoriz-
ing the county to establish a funding board empowered to
compromise the railroad debt. But the board accom-
plished little. It met for several years before it could even
agree on a system by which to compromise the debt,
finally dissolving after voters refused to participate in the
annual election of its members. Eventually the county
issued some bonds in supposed settlement of the debt-
but then repudiated them. Faced with this new recalci-
trance, many bondholders obtained judgments from state
and federal courts. By 1896, as the result of the judg-
ments, the county tax levy had soared to over twelve
dollars per $100 of valuation. But most of the tax was
never collected, because the court-appointed collectors
either refused to serve or were run out of the county by
irate residents. The United States Supreme Court solidi-
fied the impasse by refusing to appoint a special collector
under the supervision of the federal judiciary.
One bondholder who made his living by investing in
repudiated bonds would not be frustrated by the stale-
mate. Organizing his own private army, he forced the
county court to appoint him collector ofthe tax and then at
gunpoint persuaded the taxpayers to pay. But most bond-
holders displayed no such brashness and did not receive
a penny on their bonds until early in the twentieth cen-
tury, when the dispute was finally settled by a more
responsible county court. In the meantime, the county's
economy stagnated under the cloud of its government's
battered credit and near insolvency.
In other counties citizens resorted to more violent
means to resolve their problems with bondholders. After
failing to halt construction of the railroad by means of
armed attacks, Marion County vigilantes attempted to
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prevent the sheriff from collecting the railroad tax. Green
County residents burned down the barn ofthe railroad tax
collector and threatened his deputies with the same treat-
ment. Plunging the county into "a frightful state of dis-
order and anarchy," the tax resisters succeeded in their
attempts to curtail county tax collection. Tongue in
cheek, Taylor County offered to settle its indebtedness
by giving bondholders its worthless railroad stock. Only a
last-minute decision by the United States Supreme Court
saved members of the Allen County Court from con-
tempt-of-court jail sentences for failure to enforce judg-
ments on repudiated bonds. Other counties resisted just
as fiercely, some carrying their fights into the twentieth
century.
6FINANCES AND REFORM
No SUBJECT EXCITED nineteenth-century Kentuckians
more than taxes, and no division of government played a
greater part in taxation than the counties. County officials
assessed and collected state and county taxes and spent
county revenues. All phases of this system were con-
troversial and, in some counties, outrageous.
A poll tax of up to three dollars per adult male consti-
tuted the principal county tax throughout the nineteenth
century. Its defenders praised it as the only effective way
to force the propertyless to contribute to the expenses of
government. Its detractors damned it as "oppressive,"
"retrogressive," and a "product of a barbarous age." As
the century passed, more and more states (mostly
northern) abolished the tax so that by 1870 critics could
declare the tribute "unworthy of a civilized nation in the
nineteenth century."
In theory the poll tax may have been an excellent way
to compel the poor to pay their fair share of the cost of
government, but in practice it generally failed. Most
evaded the tax by simply refusing to pay it, pleading no
funds. Delinquency rates in most counties exceeded 20
percent of the eligible taxpayers. Some secured exemp-
tions from the county court; others ignored the entire
process, usually with impunity. On the other side of the
economic spectrum, wealthy taxpayers welcomed the tax
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as a way to avoid the much greater burdens associated
with ad valorem property taxes, although the latter type
of tax was frequently levied to pay for such special proj-
ects as railroad subscriptions. Some wealthy residents
escaped the poll tax entirely by securing the exemption
normally granted the "aged."
Theoretically fairer, since it was based on the value of
each taxpayer's personal and real property, in fact state
taxation also contained many inequities. Because each
taxpayer did his own evaluating, the assessor lacking the
time and personnel to do it himself (and often the forti-
tude and competence), many succeeded in undervaluing
their taxable property, and not a few withheld from as-
sessment large chunks of land and personal belongings.
The rich evaded and undervalued most successfully. In
1883, Governor Knott contended that Boyd County
horses were assessed at a higher valuation than much
finer steeds in Bourbon County, and two years later he
noted that Indiana's assessed valuation was twice that of
Kentucky's even though Kentucky had a greater taxable
acreage.
Such inconsistencies and evasions not surprisingly
sparked taxpayer revolts, the most sensational of which
occurred in Pendleton County during the period from
1877 to 1879. There the county court taxed and borrowed
at record levels, failing to account for expenditures, and
sheriffs specialized in double taxation for some and none
for others. Outraged taxpayers formed a committee of
safety at a mass meeting early in 1877. After interviewing
county officials and taxpayers, the committee accused the
local gove,rnment of discrimination against the poor, of
misappropriation ofpublic funds, and of failure to collect
over $25,000 in delinquent back taxes. Although the
county court rolled back the amount of the poll tax, it
refused to publish a detailed accounting of expenditures
or to change its procedures in the ways demanded by the
reformers.
Frustrated by the intransigence of county officials, the
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committee turned to the commonwealth attorney and
grand jury for assistance. The jury investigated the
problem and found that many of the committee's accusa-
tions rang true. But strangely it failed to produce indict-
ments, referring the controversy back to the county
court-which continued to resist meaningful reform.
Over the next two years accusations and insults were
traded back and forth, each side charging the other with
corruption and immorality. Finally, the county began
printing more detailed financial statements, making a
better effort to collect back taxes, and collecting current
taxes more uniformly. While the committee asserted that
more revisions were in order, by 1879 taxpayer interest
in the controversy abated and the impulse for further
change withered and died.
County appropriation policy was no more satisfactory
than the taxation system. Those with claims against the
county had to submit them to the county court, wait for
the court to approve them, and then wait still longer for
the sheriff to collect enough taxes to pay them. This
process sometimes took a year or longer, since the court
seldom met more than twice a year on the business of its
debts and sheriffs normally found it difficult to collect
taxes rapidly and efficiently. Thus many who were de-
pendent upon the government for their livelihood were
forced to sell their claims against the county to profes-
sional brokers at reduced rates.
Adding to the burden of those doing business with
counties or hired by them to perform specific services was
the often inequitable method by which county officials
processed claims. Although the county attorney was re-
quired by statute to screen all claims, he seldom did this
effectively, and the members of the county court had to
sift through the bills for themselves. Rather than spend
the time to determine the validity of each claim, the
courts often arbitrarily halved claims. Shrewd claimants,
anticipating this, normally doubled the amount of their
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claims and suffered no loss. But more innocent creditors,
not understanding the system or fearful of engaging in
fraudulent practices, found themselves cheated out of
half of their claims.
The method ofpaying county officials compounded the
grievances of nineteenth-century Kentuckians. Fees
rather than salaries accounted for the bulk of the income
ofmost county officers. Only the county judge and county
attorney received salaries, and in both cases the salaries
were supplemented by fees for certain services. Since the
amount of income received by officers depended upon
the number of services they performed for county resi-
dents, needless or repetitious functions were en-
couraged. Even fee gouging could not raise the incomes
of the officers of poorer counties to levels of respecta-
bility, but it did enable those ofwealthier, more populous
counties to achieve sizable incomes. The officers of Jef-
ferson County sometimes earned as much as $40,000
annually, an income that attracted hordes of aspirants to
these positions. Observers noted that no other class of
citizens in the commonwealth "received better pay and
did less work."
Typically the legislature responded slowly and in-
adequately to these grievances. It required certain
counties to validate their claims more expeditiously and
fairly but did almost nothing to insure their swifter liqui-
dation. Toward the end of the century a few counties
opted for a commission form ofgovernment, replacing the
justices of the peace on the court of claims with three
elected commissioners. Supporters argued that three
businessmen could handle the financial burdens of the
county much more efficiently than ten or twenty justices
of the peace who hardly ever seemed to have much
business acumen. Despite the reported success of this
experiment, constitutional reformers did not make the
change mandatory for all counties. Demands for the abo-
lition of the fee system produced no results.
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The failure of the General Assembly to respond satis-
factorily to the fiscal shortcomings ofKentucky' s counties
stemmed from its own institutional deficiencies. The
commonwealth's legislators were much more adept at
presiding over the pageantry of politicking (burgoos,
barbecues, and court day speeches), than they were at
legislating. An observer contended that Kentucky's stat-
utes were the laughingstock of the nation. So disarranged
and illogical were the laws that one of them required
commonwealth attorneys to enforce the criminal statutes,
while another forbade them to practice law except in civil
proceedings.
Stupidity, inattention, and laziness alone did not ac-
count for the sins of the legislature. That body also found
itself increasingly bogged down in the mire of local and
special legislation, a problem directly related to the fact
that the counties were so numerous. Often legislatures
responded to the needs of citizens and special interests
on an individual basis rather than enacting general laws
applicable to everyone. Thus, instead of formulating a
general incorporation law that would establish standards
for all would-be corporations and delegate their supervi-
sion to a separate administrative agency such as a bureau
of corporations, the legislature itself chartered each com-
pany, taking the time to enumerate powers and limita-
tions. In the same way, the legislature addressed itself to
the problems of individual counties, granting this sheriff
an extension oftime in which to collect taxes and ratifying
that county court's delinquent tax levy. By 1850, the
General Assembly devoted most of its sessions to such
local and special laws and spent almost no time on the
general problems of the commonwealth, which, ironi-
cally, grew more acute as technology bound Kentuckians
more closely together. The great number of requests for
special legislation meant the assembly, which met only
biennially after 1850, lacked sufficient time to consider
each one adequately. It also meant that counties them-
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selves largely controlled the legislation affecting their in-
terests.
Normally when a county desired legislation its officers
drafted a bill themselves or in conjunction with the local
state representative and senator. Because of the tradition
of legislative courtesy by which legislators did not chal-
lenge the bills of other legislators affecting their own
local affairs, and because of the multitude of such pro-
posals, the assembly did not have time to review local
legislative bills with the care they demanded. Conse-
quently counties actually possessed powers of legislation
that theoretically belonged to the legislature.
As the number of special and local statutes increased
(in 1873, of 1,119 statutes 1,034 were local or special in
nature), so, too, did the demands for their prohibition.
Several Civil War legislatures restricted the time devoted
to such bills, and one governor vetoed several local stat-
utes on the grounds that laws should apply equally to all
counties, but until the Constitutional Convention of
1890, demands for more comprehensive reform came to
naught. Feeling that their constituents almost unani-
mously desired basic change, the delegates to the con-
vention outlawed most local and special legislation,
causing future statute books to decrease markedly in size
and future legislatures to have more time for the
problems of the state as a whole.
But local legislation was only one of several problems
afflicting county government. Under the system that pre-
vailed until 1850, county courts were not only undemo-
cratic but disorderly, inattentive, cumbersome, and inex-
pert. A majority of the justices of the peace had to be in
attendance when major business was conducted, and
courts found it difficult to muster quorums. In Barren
County, a tavern owner had to wait eight months before a
court could round up enough justices to hear his petition
for a new license. Some courts fined members for absence
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without cause (and one went so far as to advertise for its
missing members to appear), but most tolerated even the
grossest negligence. While circuit courts had some au-
thority to punish justices who failed to attend to court
business, commonwealth attorneys seldom initiated ac-
tion.
The steady expansion of the membership of the county
courts in the first half of the century contributed to the
cumbersomeness of the tribunals. A typical court session
produced scenes of "confusion and disorder." Justices
wandered in and out of the courtroom, sitting for only
portions of cases. Sometimes when an even number of
justices voted on specific issues, evenly split decisions
would follow, with more indecision. Individual legis-
lators introduced bills to cope with the problems, but the
General Assembly refused to enact them. While some
courts issued formal rules of order and procedure, most
tolerated extreme informality bordering on chaos. A
foreign visitor to an early nineteenth-century courtroom
condemned the "wrangling and disputing" lawyers, the
"clamorous" litigants, the "pertinacious and contemp-
tuous" witnesses, and the "curious," "drunk,"
"laughing," and "shouting" spectators.
Most of the justices of the peace under the old court
system lacked legal training, and despite their relatively
high socioeconomic status, they refused to devote the
time necessary to master the nuances of the legal spe-
cialties within their collective jurisdiction. Because of
this lack of dedication, the record of the local tribunals
upon review too often revealed numerous blunders. Ob-
servers especially castigated the courts for their execu-
tion of the probate laws, accusing the justices of negli-
gence and even fraud.
Almost from the beginning of statehood in 1792, re-
formers demanded changes in the old county court
system. In 1794, a correspondent to the Kentucky Gazette
denounced the "petty tyrants" on the courts whose com-
bination ofpowers served only the interests ofthe aristoc-
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racy and not those of the people. On the eve of the
Constitutional Convention of 1799, some protested the
ability ofjustices of the peace to sit in the legislature and
write the laws they would later enforce as individual
magistrates and members of the county courts. "Why
shall we suffer them to lord it over us with the pre-emi-
nence of such dangerous, complicated and extensive
powers?" asked another of the Gazette's correspond-
ents.
Despite these complaints and others, the county courts
and county government in general emerged stronger than
ever from the Constitutional Convention of 1799 which
drafted the commonwealth's second constitution. The
delegates converted the sheriffalty, which had been an
elective office, to one firmly under the control of the
county court. They did not prohibit justices of the peace
from sitting in the General Assembly, and large numbers
ofthem continued to do so during the early decades ofthe
nineteenth century.
Added to the problems of cumbersomeness, inatten-
tiveness, disorderliness, and inexpertness, the emer-
gence of the first two-party system in Kentucky placed
immense strains on the old county court system. Politi-
cians successful at the ballot box were not always able to
penetrate the closed quarters of county government.
Many of these were Whig politicians from counties that
voted Whig consistently but maintained Democratic
county courts because of the constitutional guarantees of
self-perpetuation. Whig frustrations at being closed out of
many county governments, along with a growing split in
their party, presented the Democrats (frustrated by their
proscription from many state offices) with enough lev-
erage to secure a referendum on the question of another
constitutional convention in 1847 and 1848. County court
gangs rallied in defense of the old constitution, but de-
spite their intense efforts, Kentuckians overwhelmingly
endorsed a convention call for 1849. During the cam-
paign to elect delegates it became apparent that the old
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court system was a principal issue. Most candidates de-
manded changes, and the few who defended the status
quo suffered overwhelming defeat.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1849
converted county government from one of self-perpetua-
tion to what was essentially a democratic institution.
Voters would thereafter elect all county officers for lim-
ited terms. Seeking to eliminate the awkwardness of the
county court, the framers of Kentucky's third constitution
created the office ofcounty judge to perform the functions
ofthe old county court except forthose relating to its fiscal
responsibilities.
Other than opening up county government to greater
numbers of aspiring politicians, it is questionable
whether the reformers of 1849 accomplished much in
their new charter for the commonwealth. The reformers
had failed to address themselves to many of the basic
problems of the counties. Officers continued to be paid
primarily from fees, and fee-gouging continued to plague
the citizenry. Elected officials did not seem to perform
any more competently than appointed ones, although the
new office of county judge did bring some semblance of
order to county court proceedings.
Above all else, the reformers of 1849 did not come to
grips with the excessive number of counties in the com-
monwealth. Although nineteenth-century legislatures
did not create as many counties after 1849 as had been
established before that date, they nonetheless added
nineteen to the already staggering number of one
hundred. Increasingly, critics began to write and speak of
"pauper counties"-those that received more state rev-
enue than they produced. At first such a description fit
counties mostly in eastern and southeastern Kentucky,
but by 1890 it applied to nearly two-thirds of the state's
local governments. In marked contrast, a handful ofurban
and Bluegrass counties, such as Jefferson, Kenton, Camp-
bell, Fayette, Bourbon, Shelby, Scott, and Woodford
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counties, contributed 80 percent of the net revenue that
went into the state treasury.
Many perceived a direct connection between the
number of Kentucky counties and county poverty.
Counties with small populations often found it difficult to
elect qualified public officials. Critics noted that the
abundance of counties produced the need for more local
juries, contributed to the state's high crime rate, and
caused many areas to go without needed improvements
in transportation. The incompetence of county officials
often led to inadequate tax assessment and collection and
poor fiscal management. Smaller counties meant smaller
tax bases, a serious handicap in an age oflimited state and
federal economic assistance.
As the number of pauper counties multiplied, so did
calls for their abolition. Seldom did such propositions
reach the legislature, and when they did they usually
perished in committee, although the General Assembly
nearly abolished Rowan County in 1888. Cynics spec-
ulated that the county escaped annihilation only because
its partial merger with neighboring Fleming County
would have reduced the strength of the state's dominant
Democratic party.
Newspaper editors especially desired the consolida-
tion of counties. Writing in 1871, the editor of the Mays-
ville Bulletin proposed the abolition of all counties
created since 1845 - or at least a permanent stop to the
creation of new counties. In the journalist's opinion,
government in many of the smaller counties had become
"a ridiculous farce" because there were too few intelli-
gent and competent men to run local affairs. In one
instance, the editor reported, a healthy county with many
bridges and turnpikes had. given birth to several new
counties whose smaller tax bases could not support mac-
adamized roads or maintain routine services without state
subsidies. The editor of the Kentucky Gazette advanced
another formula for dealing with surplus counties. "Each
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and every county that has through a course of years
proven itself incapable of supporting itself ought to be
consolidated with another county and, if the new county
still proves unable to take care of itself, let consolidation
go on until they do become self sustaining."
The nineteenth-century movement to consolidate
counties reached its height at the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1890-1891. Delegates seriously debated the ques-
tion, some asserting that the people demanded restric-
tions on the formation of new counties and even the
abolition of existing ones, while others argued that many
areas desired to add themselves to the growing number of
counties. Kentucky's love affair with counties was high-
lighted by the contention of some delegates that the state
lacked the power to merge counties, a proposition con-
tradicting the leading national authorities on the subject.
Although the reformers did not abolish any counties, they
did provide for the possibility by granting such power to
future legislatures. Furthennore, the convention voted to
impose restrictions on the formation of additional
counties.
The constitutional convention addressed itself to other
problems of county government. The delegates imposed
debt limitations on the counties, many of which had
plunged into bankruptcy during the railroad craze of the
previous forty years. They gave to future legislatures the
option of abolishing the assessorship and of merging the
office of commonwealth's attorney with the county at-
torney's office and the jailership with the sheriffalty.
Counties also were given the option of adopting the
commission form of government.
Despite these reforms, convention delegates left the
county system largely intact. The fee system prevailed,
except in Jefferson County, and continued to plague the
performance of county officials. Experts studying county
government in the 1920s and 1930s called for the aboli-
tion of the fee system, asserting that it caused county
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officials to take a proprietary attitude toward their posi-
tions. Although the legislature refused to heed the calls
for reform, it did place limitations on the compensation of
county officers by a law providing that surplus fees
should go to the fiscal courts. But some county officials
reportedly ignored this provision, and the state seem-
ingly lacked sufficient employees and funds to enforce
it.
Nor did the reformers remedy the headless structure of
county government. No officer possessed the power to
direct the over-all policy of county government. Twen-
tieth-century commentators began to expose the problem
but achieved no changes. While certain officials in some
counties might become de facto leaders of their local
government, their influence was usually only political in
nature and temporary in duration.
Beset by the debilitating influence of the fee system
and the absence of supervisory control, county officers
continued to perform their official duties inconsistently.
Some sheriffs still neglected the enforcement of criminal
laws from either negligence or lack of funds while others
performed remarkably, although they were shorthanded
and underfunded. An observer noted in 1923 that the
sheriff of Ohio County was "not interested in serving
warrants of any kind, either civil or criminal ... ; [his]
chief interest is in collecting taxes." Other sheriffs per-
formed in like manner, especially neglecting the enforce-
ment ofprohibition laws. Similar conditions prevailed in
the 1930s, according to another commentator, who advo-
cated the establishment of a state police force to augment
county law enforcement. Responding to this and other
such calls, the legislature finally created a state police
department in 1948. After World War II some urban
counties created separate county police forces, but most
continued to rely on the sheriff as their principal po-
liceman. Lack of funds made it difficult for some sheriffs
to patrol their counties adequately. In 1974, the sheriff of
Edmonson County donated most of his personal fees to
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provide his county with twenty-four-hour protection, but
despite his charity, voters overwhelmingly rejected a
special tax which would have provided a permanent
source of funds for law enforcement. State-wide, legis-
lators and voters contributed to the problem by refusing
to vote increases in compensation and rejecting a consti-
tutional amendment allowing sheriffs to serve successive
terms.
Continuing the decline that began with the reforms of
1849-1850, justices of the peace had fallen to a level of
general judicial incompetence by the twentieth century.
Fortunately for Kentucky's litigants, most ceased to per-
form judicial functions by the 1920s, confining them-
selves to the affairs of fiscal courts where they performed
more ably. In 1975, Kentuckians achieved a major reform
when they ratified a constitutional amendment stripping
the justices and county judges of their judicial duties and
transferring these responsibilities to newly created dis-
trict judges trained in the law.
At least in the first part of the twentieth century, other
county officers remained bogged down in fee gouging,
conflict ofinterests, and neglect ofduty. County attorneys
sometimes represented clients whom they should have
been prosecuting, or refused to investigate or prosecute
suspected wrongdoers because they were "friends." In
1923, citing the county attorneys' general lack of knowl-
edge of the fundamentals of the law, the attorney general
unavailingly called for the merger of the county at-
torney's office with that of the commonwealth's attorney
and the creation ofa special task force to oversee prosecu-
tions in certain of the counties.
Other nineteenth-century problems persisted. Jailers
found it difficult to maintain secure jails. County courts
continued to sell treasuryships in violation of the law.
Claims processing continued to be arbitrary until gener-
ally effective reforms were undertaken in the 1930s. Tax
assessment and collection continued to be unfair. Re-
forms corrected abuses here, too, although some critics
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denied the efficacy of the changes. Debt limitations did
not prevent many counties from repudiating bonds
during the Depression. Gradually throughout the twen-
tieth century, counties relinquished to the state their
control over roads, and what jurisdiction they retained
was strengthened by more modern approaches to mainte-
nance.
With the Depression and the need for fiscal retrench-
ment, reformers renewed their calls for county consolida-
tion. In 1931, Professor John W. Manning, a political
scientist at the University of Kentucky, argued that
counties were obsolete in an age of sophisticated trans-
portation and communication and called for the reduction
oftheir number in Kentucky from 120 to 20. Such a move,
Manning contended, would save the taxpayers over
$2,500,000 per year as well as rid the state ofmany "misfit
uniformities" which applied to rural and urban sections
alike. Impressed by Manning's logic, the state's most
influential newspaper, the Louisville Courier-Journal,
enthusiastically supported his proposals, noting that con-
solidation would eliminate many useless jobs and dupli-
cations of services. The Courier-Journal also predicted
that merger would seriously weaken the county political
machines which, in its opinion, accounted "for practi-
cally every evil in [state] government from inequality of
representation to inequality of taxation."
Others rallied to support Manning's proposal, in-
cluding the state official most acquainted with the real-
ities of county finances, the Inspector and Examiner. The
proposal elicited a lively debate in the Courier-]ournal's
letters to the editor, with most writers supporting con-
solidation. One irate correspondent submitted that
merger would reduce the number of government offi-
cials-"largely the cause of our mental distress and our
financial decay." Several other newspapers joined the
Courier-]ournal's campaign.
Despite their early initiative and the logic of their
demands, reformers found themselves outnumbered and
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outmaneuvered by supporters of the status quo. Rather
than save Kentuckians' tax dollars, stand-patters argued,
consolidation would increase expenditures, since new
courthouses would have to be built to accommodate
larger counties, and county residents would have to
spend more for transportation to remote county seats.
Some even raised the nineteenth-century specter of gen-
eral lawlessness should large numbers of counties be
eliminated; they asserted that such a change would make
law enforcement much more difficult. Others predicted
the collapse of the economies of towns whose status as
county seats would be wiped out by consolidation.
More important than these arguments was the political
power of the stand-patters. "One hundred twenty en-
trenched courthouse cliques, and their families and
friends" formed the nucleus ofpolitical opposition to any
change in county boundaries. Often derived from these
cliques and usually dependent upon them in large degree
for reelection and political support, legislators and ad-
ministrators in Frankfort feared the consequences if they
tampered with local tradition. County newspapers, often
the beneficiaries of profitable county printing contracts,
opposed consolidation out of self-interest. Undergirding
the opposition to reform were hundreds of thousands of
rural Kentuckians who derived special pride from their
spirited loyalty to their counties.
Confronted with intense lobbying by county officials
and their allies, and beset with their own insecurities,
legislators quickly rejected all attempts at consolidation
in the 1930s and thereafter. The Constitutional Revision
Assembly of 1964-1966 actually made consolidation
more difficult in their proposed new constitution. Even
so, courthouse gangs, fearful of any change that might
remotely threaten their bastions, led the successful fight
against the new charter, which was buried at the polls in
1966. In a rare departure from the general trend against
change, Fayette County merged with the city of Lex-
ington in 1974, after voters solidly supported consolida-
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tion; but one year later voters in Boyd County over-
whelmingly rejected a proposed merger of the
governments ofAshland and Catlettsburg with that of the
county.
Kentucky is not the only state with an antiquated
system of local government. County structures in almost
every other state contain outdated and useless institu-
tional devices and personnel. And in other states, too,
reformers have largely failed. Instead, the national trend
is toward a proliferation of local governmental units. In
1966, the Committee for Improvement of Management in
Government reported that there were more than 80,000
such units, including over 3,000 counties and more than
twenty times as many special districts. Of these local
units, in the words of an early twentieth-century expert,
the county remains the "dark continent of American
politics." Dark though it may be, the county reigns su-
preme in Kentucky.
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